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Abstract  
In this thesis the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is used as a case to explain 
the role credible deterrence plays in the 21st century. The goal is to contribute to our 
understanding of the complex dynamics relating to nuclear weapons between the DPRK, the 
United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). It also sheds light on factors that may 
increase or decrease North Korean deterrence credibility.  
The main objective is to understand DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and explain North 
Korean deterrence credibility. This thesis does this by drawing upon literature and 
information provided by respondents through conducted elite interviews. The study uses the 
information provided to discuss to what extent DPRK’s nuclear weapons deter the United 
States and the ROK. The analysis goes deeper into the relationship between the three states 
and their nuclear weapons. The aim is to describe the role of deterrence and explain its impact 
on the relationship between the DPRK, the United States and the ROK. It identifies North 
Korean nuclear abilities and its will to use nuclear weapons against another state, and it 
discusses to which degree the United States and the ROK feel threatened by North Korean 
nuclear weapons.  
The findings indicate that the United States and the ROK is partially disposed to DPRK’s 
nuclear deterrence because the DPRK do not at this moment have a reliable capability to hit 
the continental United States with nuclear weapons, but the DPRK has the capability to hit 
targets in the ROK, and American vital interests outside of the United States. Even though the 
DPRK can hurt the United States and the ROK with nuclear weapons, it seems unlikely that 
the DPRK would use nuclear weapons against another state because it appears that the 
leadership is a rational actor and regime survival is of greatest importance. The thesis argues 
that the DPRK is unlike any other country, and this makes predicting what the DPRK will do 
in a given situation almost impossible.   
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1 Introduction 
Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and weapons surrounded by 
massive secrecy. It is estimated that the world’s nuclear states possess around 17,000 of these 
weapons, but the secrecy prohibits most people from knowing the exact number. These 
17,000 nuclear weapons are divided between eight or nine nuclear states1 and located in 13 or 
14 different countries2 (Federation of American Scientists, 2013; Høibråten, Halvor Kippe, 
Breivik, Heireng, & Enger, 2013).  
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an international treaty 
whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. It also 
works to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of 
achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT was opened 
for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. More countries have adhered to the NPT 
than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement (NPT, 1968). The NPT classifies 
states into two groups, nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states 
(NNWS). The NWS are the United States of America, the Russian Federation (Russia), the 
United Kingdom, France and the People’s Republic of China. These are states which had 
“manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 
January, 1967” (NPT, 1968). These countries are allowed to keep their arsenals for the time 
being, but are through the NPT obliged to work towards full disarmament. The NNWS on the 
other hand are not allowed to possess or develop nuclear weapons through the NPT. The 
NNWS are also required to develop and adhere to a Safeguard Agreement3 with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA was established as an autonomous 
organization on 29 July 1957. The IAEA is responsible for verifying compliance with the 
NPT and is allowed to conduct onsite inspections on all declared nuclear facilities to the 
NNWS who are party to the treaty. The IAEA also seeks to promote the peaceful use of 
                                                 
1 Israel has never confirmed nor denied to possessing nuclear weapons. Various reports indicate that Israel does 
in fact have nuclear weapons, but since this never has been proven one always refers to eight or nine states when 
speaking of states that possess nuclear weapons. Israel is the ninth state.  
2  On top of the eight or nine states possessing nuclear weapons, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Turkey are hosting approximately 150-200 American B61 tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons on their soil as 
part of a NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement (ICAN, 2014).  
3 The IAEA has safeguards agreements in force with over 170 States around the world. Most of these are 
comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT. Other types of agreements are known as 
voluntary offer safeguards agreements (in force with the five NPT nuclear-weapon States) and item specific 
safeguards agreements (in force with three States not party to the NPT) (IAEA, 2013) 
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nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons 
(Fischer, 1997).  
A third category is used for states that have conducted nuclear test after 1 January 1967. 
These states can only be classified as NNWS according to the NPT. India, Pakistan and the 
North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK), and 
sometimes Israel are referred to as de facto NWS, but this is not an official category. India 
and Pakistan never joined the NPT and have demonstrated their possession of nuclear 
weapons through test explosions. The DPRK withdrew from the treaty in 2003 before 
conducting its first nuclear test in 2006 and Israel has never confirmed nor denied to having 
nuclear weapons, but various reports indicate that Israel is in fact a de facto NWS (Heireng & 
Enger, 2010, pp. 9–10; Høibråten et al., 2013). The information available for each country’s 
nuclear weapons program varies greatly. The most transparent nuclear weapons state is the 
United States while the most opaque is the DPRK (Federation of American Scientists, 2013). 
Estimates for several of the nuclear weapon states are highly uncertain (Federation of 
American Scientists, 2013) 
Table 1.1  Total number of nuclear warheads  
Country 
 
 
 
Total number of nuclear warheads 
Operational4 
Strategic 
Operational 
Tactical 
Reserve/ 
Non-
deployed 
Military 
Stockpile 
Total 
Inventory 
Russia  1,800 0  2,700 4,500  8,500 
United States   1,950 200  2,500 4,650 7,700 
France  290 n.a. ? 300 300 
China  0 ? 180 250 250 
United 
Kingdom 
160 n.a. 65 225 225 
Israel  0 n.a. 80 80 80 
Pakistan  0 n.a. 100-120 100-120 100-120 
India  0 n.a. 90-110 90-110 90-110 
the DPRK  0 n.a. <10 <10 <10 
Total  ~4,200 ~200 ~5,800 ~10,200  ~17,300 
(Federation of American Scientists, 2013) 
                                                 
4 Tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are the two main categories when it comes to nuclear weapons. Tactical 
nuclear weapons (also known as non-strategic nuclear weapons) are made to be used on the battlefield in a 
military situation. Strategic weapons are the opposite; they have a more classic deterrent effect. They are made to 
be used to damage the enemy’s ability to fight a war and are to be used against cities. Tactical nuclear weapons 
constituted a large part of the peak nuclear weapons stockpile levels during the Cold War (Federation of 
American Scientists, 2013).  
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All NWS insist that nuclear weapons are essential to their national security (Norris & 
Kristensen, 2010, pp. 82–83), but nuclear weapons have only been used twice in war. The 
first time was 6 August 1945 when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, 
Japan; three days later, it released the second bomb on Nagasaki (Thelle, 2013, p. 8). Even 
though these weapons have not been used in anger since 1945, are they supposedly important 
for eight or nine of the world's most powerful countries’ national security. An important 
question is why. 
During the duration of the Cold War, the rivalry between the United States and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) defined the international society and the world we live in. 
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed the nature of the international system and 
the laws that govern it in an instant.  The world before the bombings was fundamentally 
different from the world that followed (Zagare & Kilgour, 2000, p. 3). At that point, Bernard 
Brodie argued that “the chief purpose of our military establishment (had) been to win war. 
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them; it can have almost no other purpose” 
(Brodie, Dunn, Wolfers, Corbett, & Fox, 1946, p. 76).  The multipolar Eurocentric world did 
no longer exist after 1945; it had been replaced by a system dominated by two superpowers 
from the periphery of the European state system. It was in this context that classical 
deterrence theory was born, and it matured in the 1950s and 1960s and many strategic 
thinkers nurtured its growth. With seemingly good reason, the principles of the theory 
became, in both academic and official circles, the conventional wisdom. Not only did 
classical deterrence theory explain the absence of a United States of America – USSR war 
after 1945, but if properly observed, could be used to all but eliminate the possibility of future 
superpower conflict (Zagare & Kilgour, 2000, p. 4).  
In recent years, several books and articles have been written that both denounce and support 
the effectiveness of deterrence in relation to nuclear weapons. Ordinary deterrence sometimes 
fails even though the consequences are severe, still nuclear theorists claim that nuclear 
deterrence is more reliable, and deterrence theory claims to know the answer to why these 
eight or nine countries hold on to their nuclear weapons. According to them is deterrence the 
best defense possible. This study aims to shed light on to which degree deterrence in the 21st 
century “works” according to classical deterrence theory. This thesis will do this by going 
deeper into the relationship between states and their nuclear weapons. The aim of this study is 
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both descriptive and explanatory. It wishes to describe the role of deterrence and explain its 
impact on relationship between states.   
1.1 Research Question   
The main focus of this study is to examine how the United States and the Republic of Korea 
are disposed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear deterrence? This 
question will be answered by looking at two sub-questions a) are DPRK’s nuclear threats 
towards the United States and the ROK credible? and b) are the United States and the ROK’s 
vital interests exposed to DPRK’s deterrence? 
This thesis is a case study of the DPRK. It focuses on which degree North Korean nuclear 
weapons deter the United States and the Republic of Korea (the ROK). The main research 
question combined with the two inter-related questions may indicate whether or not DPRK’s 
nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect. In terms of the first question, there are a lot of 
speculations on whether or not a deterrent power’s opponent is actually disposed to 
deterrence. With regards to question a it is fundamental to look at the credibility of deterrence 
threats when answering question b it is important to identify a country’s vital interests and 
also whether or not these interests get threatened when one is exposed to deterrence.  
To answer the research questions, the thesis will draw upon the concept of deterrence and 
theories related to this. The aspects introduced in the three research questions will be 
elaborated and defined in the chapters and sections that the aspects are introduced. This part 
of the thesis will just shortly introduce the reader to the different aspects. Deterrence is 
broadly defined as the threat of force intended to convince a potential aggressor not to 
undertake a particular action (Gerson, 2009, p. 34). This is because the cost will be 
unacceptable or the probability of success extremely low (ibid). This concept will be 
thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3 and Section 3.3. A threat is a liable declaration that signals 
an intention to hurt somebody unless that somebody acts in the way that the threatened wants 
to. The hurt inflicted on someone can be physically, economically, or otherwise and can also 
be inflicted directly or indirectly on the target (Hovi, 1998, p. 12). A threat can be considered 
effective if the one targeted changes its behavior in accordance with the threatener’s wishes 
and five conditions have to be fulfilled for a threat to be considered effective. These 
conditions are; relevance, severity, credibility, complete and clarity. Effective will be 
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operationalized in Chapter 5 and reasons will there be given to why the focus in this thesis is 
on credibility. What one defines a vital interest is a complicated issue; some interests may be 
vital, while others may be less vital. It is also known that states have altered their opinion of 
their own vital issues during the course of a conflict (Cohen, 1994, p. 161). What this thesis 
defines as American and South Korean vital interests will be discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 8 
1.2 Why Study the DPRK?  
The DPRK is a sovereign state in East Asia, on the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. The 
country shares a border with China to the north and north-west and a short border with Russia 
to the north-east. The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) marks the boundary between the 
DPRK and the ROK. The legitimacy of this border is not accepted by either side, as both 
states claim to be the legitimate government of the entire peninsula (CNN, 2013). The DPRK 
has a troubled relationship with several other states, but especially with its neighbor on the 
Korean peninsula and the United States. 
The focus of this thesis is on DPRK’s relationship with the United States and the ROK. This 
thesis could have focused on other states instead like China and Russia because these two 
countries both share a border with the DPRK. China and the USSR were both participants in 
the Korean War and have deep ties and relations to the DPRK. Many analyses emphasize the 
importance of the DPRK-China relation in terms of the United States because it is argued that 
the DPRK serves as a buffer between China and the United States. The thesis could also have 
focused on Japan along with the United States and the ROK because the DPRK has on several 
occasions threatened to “consume Tokyo in nuclear flames” (RT, 2013). This analysis is 
narrowed to the DPRK, the United States and the ROK because the DPRK do not direct 
nuclear threats towards either China or Russia. This thesis looks at DPRK’s deterrence 
credibility and its focus is therefore on states that the DPRK are trying to deter with its 
nuclear weapons.  If a third country (Japan) were to be introduced in this thesis then it would 
not have been possible to do an in-depth focus on the situation between the DPRK and the 
United States and the ROK because a substantial amount of other background information on 
the relation between the DPRK and Japan would have had to be included. This would have 
taken the focus and space away from the analysis that has been conducted in this thesis. The 
United States has nuclear weapons and is one of the nuclear superpowers. It is therefore 
interesting to look at the relationship between such a powerful nuclear state and the DPRK 
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that has a much newer and vulnerable nuclear weapons program. The ROK shares a border 
and an intense history with the DPRK, the ROK unlike the United States and the DPRK do 
not have nuclear weapons. Studying how a big nuclear power and a neighbor with no nuclear 
power both react to DPRK’s nuclear threats will indicate DPRK’s deterrence credibility and 
that is why these two countries are at the focus of this study.  
There is a lot of secrecy surrounding the DPRK as a state as well as its nuclear weapons 
program, but it is known to have an active nuclear weapons program. The country first 
admitted on 10 February 2005 to having developed nuclear weapons and that its intention was 
to strengthen its nuclear deterrence capability.  
We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the NPT and have 
manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s evermore 
undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. Its nuclear weapons will remain 
nuclear deterrent for self-defense under any circumstances. The present reality proves 
that only powerful strength can protect justice and truth (KCNA, 2005, p. 2).5  
The DPRK have tested nuclear explosive devices on three occasions, in 2006, 2009 and 2013 
(NTI, 2013a). DPRK’s nuclear ambitions are undeniable, and this on top of its troubled 
relationships with neighboring states and other NWS makes the country a very interesting 
case to study, especially in relations to deterrence and interaction with other states. Despite 
the fact that nuclear weapons are perceived as weapons of mass destruction, the situation in 
the DPRK remains understudied. The academic literature on the topic is fragmented and 
limited, and some of the public information is both contradictory and unsubstantiated. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis  
This thesis is comprised of 9 chapters with this introduction constituting the first. Chapter 2 
gives an outline of the events leading up to the establishment of the North Korean nuclear 
weapons program.  
Chapter 3 concerns the theoretical framework and is divided into several parts. 3.1 will 
present political realism which is the basis for classical deterrence theory. Section 3.2 will 
                                                 
5 The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) is the state news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. The KCNA represents the views of the North Korean government. The news are written in English and 
meant for people outside of the DPRK. 
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briefly discuss the theories related to the structures that make an international system. In 
Section 3.3 is classical deterrence theory introduced, and Section 3.4 includes reflections for 
successful deterrence. The chapter concludes with Section 3.5 which introduces and explains 
the topic of extended deterrence.  
Chapter 4 includes methodological reflections concerning the research process and research 
design of this thesis. The important topics of validity and reliability, theory selection and 
justification for the case study research design are discussed as well as semi-structured elite 
interviews that were conducted.  
Chapter 5 introduces the three analysis chapters and explains the operationalization of the 
main concepts in this thesis. The chapter also looks into why the DPRK has acquired nuclear 
weapons.  
Chapter 6 attempts to capture whether DPRK’s nuclear threats towards the United States and 
the ROK are credible by looking at DPRK’s abilities to use nuclear weapons from a technical 
standpoint.  
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 focus on the political relationships between the states studied in this 
thesis. Chapter 7 looks into which degree the United States is exposed to DPRK’s nuclear 
deterrence by focusing on North Korean rhetoric and nuclear threats directed at the United 
States. The chapter also introduces American reactions to North Korean nuclear incidents and 
identifies which American vital interest that are exposed and threatened by North Korean 
nuclear weapons. The chapters do this by using secondary and primary literature through 
secondary literature review and elite interviews. Chapter 8 has the same structure as Chapter 7 
the focus is on the Republic of Korea instead of the United States   
Chapter 9 sums up the findings in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 and ties the answers to research 
question a and b and conclude with the findings in this study and the answers to the main 
research question.  
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2 Empirical Background 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the main features of DPRK’s nuclear 
weapons program and its history up until today. Before discussing DPRK’s deterrence effect, 
it is important to have an understanding of the context in which it operates, as well as certain 
basic information about the country and its nuclear program itself. This chapter will have 
great relevance for later analysis answering the research question.  
Section 2.1 briefly discusses the division of the Korean peninsula, the establishment of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Korean War. This part of the chapter will 
show why there is a big difference between the two Koreas today and why the tension on the 
peninsula started.  The chapter then describes, respectively, Kim Il-sung’s, Kim Jong-Il’s and 
Kim Jong-un’s transition into power in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 looks at the Juche and 
Songun, North Korean political ideologies. A country’s political state and ideology has, 
according to deterrence theories which will be presented in Chapter 3, great relevance for the 
deterrence effect of the country. This is why these two sections are included in this chapter. 
Section 2.4 takes a closer look at DPRK’s nuclear program and its nuclear capabilities. In 
order for deterrence to work, the nuclear threats posed must be credible. This section will 
show what sorts of nuclear weapons the DPRK have and how far they can be launched. The 
last section, Section 2.5, deals with the tension on the Korean peninsula and DPRK’s 
relationship to the United States. This Section will tie together the previous sections and show 
why the DPRK pursued nuclear weapons and why the country believes it is important to deter 
both the ROK and the United States.  
2.1 The Division of Korea   
Japan had colonized Korea since 1910 when the Japanese empire fell in 1945, after the 
American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese troops in the South of Korea 
surrendered to the Americans while the USSR had already conquered the North of Korea 
(Hickey, 2011, p. 1). An agreement between the two super powers resulted in a division of 
Korea, and the border between the two militarized zones were drawn along the 38th parallel6. 
                                                 
6 The border between North and South Korea is sometimes referred to as the 38th parallel. The 38th parallel is a 
circle of latitude 38 degrees north of the equatorial plane; this means that the line divides the Korean peninsula 
coarsely in half. After the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the 38th parallel was established as the boundary 
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During the course of the summer and fall of 1948, two new states were established: The 
Republic of Korea (the ROK) in the South and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(the DPRK) in the North. Both of their constitutions stated that their national territory 
constituted the whole of the Korean peninsula. The Soviets backed the Stalinist regime under 
Kim Il-sung which created the Korean People’s Army (KPA) (Hickey, 2011, p. 1).  Kim Il-
sung had in the beginning of the 1950s gotten permission from Stalin to unite the two Koreas 
with power if necessary (Nahm, 1993, p. 246).  
On 25 June 1950, after several years of clashes between the two states along the 38th parallel, 
North Koreans soldiers and tanks crossed the border and entered the ROK. The fighting that 
followed lasted until 1953. The North Koreans were receiving support from the USSR in 
terms of armaments and military advisors of high rank (Nahm, 1993, p. 246). The South 
Koreans on the other hand did at this time receive more than $ 100 million annually from the 
United States (South Korea’s national budget in 1951 was 120 million dollars), mostly in the 
form of grants (Cumings, 1997, p. 255). South Korean authorities did not capitulate after the 
invasion of Seoul, the capital of the ROK. This made Kim Il-sung decide that his forces 
would continue South, and in July more than two thirds of the South Korean territory was 
under North Korean control (Nahm, 1993, p. 249). The Americans were caught off guard by 
the invasion and got the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to invoke the United 
Nations (UN) Charter and brand the North Koreans as aggressors as they invaded further 
South. This resulted in member states of the UN being called upon for military assistance 
(Hickey, 2011, p. 1). The American troops were the first to arrive and the British government 
also responded to protect the ROK. The USSR sent troops to the Chinese-Korean border to 
protect China. Soviet aircrafts were involved in battles against UN forces (Nahm, 1993, p. 
250). Military intervention again changed the war in favor of the DPRK as China poured 
“volunteer” soldiers across the border to back up the North Korean regime. Seoul was again 
occupied by the communist forces in January 1951, but was liberated by UN forces in March 
(ibid).  
                                                                                                                                                        
by the United States. This parallel divides the Korean peninsula roughly in the middle. The actual border 
between the two countries today slants across the circle of latitude, but the border is often referred to as the 38th 
parallel (The Economist, 2013).  
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Ceasefire talks began in mid-1951 and lasted for two years. In July 1953 the Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) was established and both sides withdrew from fighting (Hickey, 2011, p. 1). The 
exact number of casualties during the Korean War will never be known, but it is estimated 
that 46,000 South Korean soldiers were killed and over 100,000 wounded. The DPRK lost 
about 215,000 soldiers while 303,000 were wounded and over 101,000 captured or missing. 
The Chinese are estimated to have lost over 400,000 soldiers, in addition to 486,000 wounded 
and over 21,000 captured. The Americans lost 40,000 during the war while the British lost 
1,078 in battle, 2,674 were left wounded and 1,060 went missing (Hickey, 2011, p. 1). 
The DPRK was left in ruins after the war. It has been estimated that 80 percent of the 
country’s production capacity was destroyed during the war (Nahm, 1993, p. 262). In the 
following years the North Korean’s attempted to get the economy back on its feet through 
targeted multi-annual plans aided by the USSR and other communist states. The economic 
growth was strong until 1967, and then the USSR reduced its assistance (Nahm, 1993, p. 
263). It was made clear during the leadership of Kim Il-sung that the DPRK wanted to stand 
on its own two feet.  
2.2 DPRK’s Three Leaders  
Ex-guerilla Kim Il-sung was installed by the USSR as head of the Provisional People’s 
Committee in Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK (IISS, 2011, p. 9). The USSR groomed 
Kim Il-sung by providing him with various types of assistance and strengthening his power 
base. With Soviet support Kim Il-sung destroyed the indigenous Communist leaders in the 
DPRK and become Chairman of the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee (later The 
People’s Committee) in 1946 and Vice-chairman of the North Korean Workers Party in 1947 
(Nahm, 1993, p. 220). When the state became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 
1948, Kim Il-sung became prime minister (Nahm, 1993, p. 234). Kim Il-sung began 
constructing his dynasty in the DPRK in the 1960s and ended up as DPRK’s undisputed 
leader (IISS, 2011, p. 9). 
His son Kim Jong-il was groomed as his father’s successor for almost three decades. Kim 
Jong-il was designated as a probable successor in 1974, but was not officially announced as 
heir to the regime until 1980 (IISS, 2011, p. 9). Kim Jong-il was appointed both as chairman 
of the National Defense Commission and as supreme commander of the army before his 
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father passed in 1994. He continued to hold these two positions after his father’s passing. He 
was not appointed Secretary General of the party until 1997. The post as President of the 
Republic belongs to Kim Il-sung forever (IISS, 2011, pp. 9–10; Nahm, 1993, p. 220).  
Kim Jong-un, the son of Kim Jong-il was introduced to the public in September 2011. He 
seemed destined to succeed his father at the time. The Kim family worked hard to make his 
succession appear inevitable. Kim Jong-un was made a four star general in 2011 without 
having any field experience in the army. He was also appointed to two powerful posts in the 
ruling Worker’s Party by his father (Mcdonald, 2011, p. 1). Kim Jong-il died in December 
2011 and Kim Jong-un was officially declared the supreme leader of the DPRK following his 
funeral. No official comprehensive biography on him has been released and very little is 
therefore known about him and his road to becoming heir as supreme leader of the DPRK 
(Mcdonald, 2011, p. 1). 
2.3 Understanding Kim Jong-un's DPRK; Juche and 
Songun  
The DPRK was born a communist state, with a command economy under a Stalinist 
dictatorship, but in the beginning of the 1950s, the DPRK developed an official state ideology 
called Juche (translates into “independence”). This ideology was first introduced and 
articulated by Kim Il-sung in December 1955 (IISS 2011, 10).  Kim Il-sung spelled out three 
specific applications of the Juche ideology which were vital: (1) political and ideological 
independence; (2) self-sustenance in the economy; and (3) a viable national defense system 
(Lerner 2010, 15). Juche stresses the principle of complete equality and mutual respect among 
nations when it comes to international relations. The DPRK has interpreted the ideology in a 
way which means that succumbing to foreign pressure or tolerating foreign intervention 
would make it completely impossible for them to maintain domestic and foreign 
independence (ibid). The impact that Juche has had on the North Korean society is clear and 
indisputable, but the impact it has had on shaping DPRK’s foreign policy is often overlooked 
(Lerner 2010, 17). Kim Il-sung forbade any other ideology from being taught or even 
discussed in the DPRK. The DPRK represents the last frontier of isolation in the world today. 
Due to the fact that the country’s policies and behavior can be explained by Juche, having an 
overview and an understanding of the ideology is essential to understanding the North Korean 
state, its politics and its people (G. Lee 2003, 112). Juche is today not the only important 
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ideology for the North Korean regime. It has been supplemented and in some sense replaced 
by Songun.  
Songun is a North Korean policy which means “military first”. This policy prioritizes the 
KPA when it comes to affairs dealing with state and the allocation of resources. Songun 
guides the political and military life in the DPRK. This means that the KPA is given high 
status within the DPRK, the army is given a primary position in both society and government 
(DeRochie, 2011). The “military first” principal guides and decides a lot of DPRK’s relations 
and interactions with other states as well as internal affairs. Songun is also used as a 
framework for the government’s work and a lot of economic resources are granted to the KPA 
because of this policy. Songun also represents an ideological concept which resulted in a shift 
in policies in 1994, (DeRochie, 2011).  
2.4 DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program and Nuclear 
Capabilities 
There is a lot of secrecy surrounding DPRK’s nuclear program. The state first admitted on 10 
February 2005 to having developed nuclear weapons, and the final confirmation came on 9 
October 2006 when it conducted its first nuclear test. The DPRK has later conducted two 
more tests, in 2009 and 2013. Even though its nuclear program is surrounded by secrecy, it is 
known that the DPRK is capable both of enriching uranium and producing weapons-grade 
plutonium. The DPRK has deployed short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles along 
with successfully launching a long-range rocket in the year 2012 (NTI, 2013a).  
DPRK’s interest in a nuclear weapons program is stated to reach back to the end of World 
War II. The state received, with the help of the USSR, its first nuclear reactor in 1962 (Lee & 
Suh, 1998, p. 124). Kim Il-sung supposedly asked Mao Zedong after China’s first explosion 
of an atomic bomb in 1964 to share the technology, but Mao supposedly rejected to do so 
(Becker, 2005, p. 179). A lot of what is known about DPRK’s nuclear program is based on 
insecure intelligence sources and information from defectors who might have had a personal 
interest in portraying the situation as more severe and dramatic than it really is (Kippe, 2003, 
p. 7). It is important to keep this in mind when discussing DPRK’s nuclear program.  
As stated in the introduction, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003. The DPRK signed 
the NPT in 1985, but it took seven years for them to complete the obligatory comprehensive 
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safeguards agreement with the IAEA enabling the Agency to verify the country’s nuclear 
program. The Safeguard agreement went into effect in April 1992 (ElBaradei, 2011, pp. 37–
47). In May of the same year, the DPRK submitted its initial declaration of nuclear materials 
to the IAEA. The Agency’s task was then to verify DPRK’s nuclear facilities and materials 
which were all intended for peaceful purposes according to the North Korean declaration 
(ibid). The IAEA requested in 1993 special inspections to two of the sites it believed stored 
nuclear waste. The request was from the IAEA’s side based on strong evidence that the 
DPRK had cheated on its commitment to the NPT, and the request was refused by the North 
Koreans. In March of the same year, the DPRK announced its intentions to withdraw from the 
NPT7, but it suspended its decision to withdraw after talks with the United States. The DPRK 
also agreed to the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards. The United States 
granted assurance to the North Koreans that they would not threaten with or use force, 
including nuclear weapons, as well as keep out of DPRK’s internal affairs. The DPRK gave a 
second notice of withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003 following the United States 
allegations that it had started a uranium enrichment program. The withdrawal became 
effective 10 April 2003 making the DPRK the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty 
(ElBaradei, 2011, pp. 37–47).  
By the year 2010 had the DPRK not only openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons for the 
first time, it also made its first real declaratory statement of its own nuclear posture in 
response to the American nuclear posture review: 
The mission of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK is to deter and repulse 
aggression and attack on the country and the nation till the nuclear weapons are 
eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world. The DPRK has invariably 
maintained the policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or 
threaten them with nukes as long as they do not join nuclear weapons states in 
invading or attacking it (Lewis, 2010).  
Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce (2011, p. 3) has written that these statements should be taken 
seriously, but one should not necessarily assume that the DPRK has the operational military 
capacity to back up these claims. It is believed that the DPRK as of 2014 possesses enough 
plutonium to make 4-10 nuclear warheads.  
                                                 
7  Article X of the NPT allows withdrawal for supreme national security considerations. 
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In the DPRK ballistic missiles are the most appropriate delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. 
The country has made significant progress in the development of several types of ballistic 
missiles since 2003. If the DPRK has an operational nuclear weapons program it is most 
likely that it is in the form of nuclear warheads on intermediate missiles called Nodong 
(Høibråten et al., 2013, p. 48). The DPRK has not been able to test a complete 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but even though testing is slow it is developing new 
ballistic missiles (ibid) 
Figure 2.1 DPRK’s missile range; maximum estimated/calculated8 
 
 
(Arms Control Association, 2012; Federation of American Scientists, 2014; Høibråten et al., 
2013, pp. 48–54) 
 
The fact that analysts do not believe that the DPRK has created a nuclear device small enough 
to be mounted on a missile, shows that Pyongyang’s ability to carry out a nuclear strike on the 
United States is less than certain (BBC, 2013b, p. 2) (see figure 2.1). The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies has indications that the DPRK has some sort of device that can 
hit United States shores, but the institute states that a “functioning nuclear-tipped 
intercontinental ballistic missile is still at least several years away” (ibid). As one can see 
                                                 
8 Out of the four missiles presented is the Nodong missile the only North Korean missile that is known to be 
operational (Høibråten, Halvor Kippe, Breivik, Heireng, & Enger, 2013, pp. 48–55). The different ballistic 
missiles and their capacity will be further discussed in chapter 6.  
Nodong-1: 900-1,500 km Taepodong-2 (2-stage): 4,000-15,000 km 
Taepodong-1: 1,500 - 2,500 km Musudan/BM-25/SS-N-6 variant: Until 3,200 km 
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from the figure above and the text, the DPRK will most likely not be able to strike the United 
States, but it could target United States interests in the region. The United States military has 
thousands of troops in the ROK, Japan, Guam and the Philippines (ibid). It is also important 
to note that the United States is obliged to defend Japan if Japan gets attacked according to 
the terms of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan (Security Treaty 
Between the United States and Japan, 1951). The DPRK are operationally capable of using 
nuclear weapons, but their options for nuclear strikes are severely constrained due to 
underdevelopment of their missiles and weapons (Hayes & Bruce, 2011).  
2.5 American Nuclear Weapons in the ROK  
The United States suffered not only loss of troops during the Korean War; the war also 
resulted in a serious financial deficit for the United States. The United States had to reduce its 
forces in Korea in order to reduce its deficit; the solution was instead to introduce nuclear 
weapons into the ROK. The United States began deploying nuclear weapons in the ROK as 
early as 19589, but word of this first started to spread in the mid-1970s. The United States 
Secretary of Defense at the time, James Schlesinger, affirmed that they had deployed nuclear 
weapons to the ROK for the first time in February 1975. Schlesinger did also on two different 
occasions, in April and June 1975, issue public threats to the DPRK. He stated that the United 
States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if the DPRK attacked the ROK, and that the 
United States would retain its nuclear weapons in the ROK (Jae-Bong, 2009, pp. 1–2).  
The DPRK started working on a massive ‘fortification of the entire land’ in the 1960s to 
protect their territory. Kim Il-sung declared in 1963 that it was necessary to dig underground 
tunnels due to the fact that by this fortification the DPRK could defeat states with nuclear 
weapons even though the DPRK did not possess them itself (Jae-Bong, 2009, p. 11). The 
North Koreans did also conduct a forward deployment towards the DMZ. This was because 
the DPRK had a plan that if the DMZ came under nuclear attack it would also hit the United 
States and South Koreans forces deployed in the area around the DMZ on both sides of the 
border. The DPRK believed that this fact would deter its enemies from reckless use of nuclear 
weapons (Jae-Bong, 2009, p. 11). The American financial deficit was not the only reason for 
                                                 
9 The Washington Post reported in October 2006 that “In 1957, the United States placed nuclear-tipped Matador 
missiles in South Korea, to be followed in later years…by nuclear artillery..” January at the latest has been used 
by the author cited because it is not clear whether the first introduction of nuclear weapons occurred in late 1957 
or early 1958 (Jae-Bong, 2009, pp. 10–11). 
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deploying nuclear weapons to the ROK. The following factors also figured into the decision 
to do so:  
1. The Americans were not willing to completely disregard a possible invasion of the 
ROK by the North Koreans. 
2. The ROK was the only place that the Americans could secretly deploy their soon to be 
scrapped nuclear weapons while also effectively targeting the USSR10. 
3. The USSR had surpassed the United States in the development of ICBMs, which is the 
delivery system that can carry nuclear weapons across oceans, and the Americans 
could not afford to deploy nuclear weapons to protect the South Koreans because they 
did not have enough missiles to spare (Jae-Bong, 2009, p. 5). 
It is widely believed that the American nuclear weapons in the ROK were withdrawn by the 
end of 1991. This is said to be because the United State and the USSR agreed on the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START)11 on 31 July 1991, but the interesting fact is that the treaty 
only covered strategic nuclear weapons, while all the American nuclear weapons in the ROK 
were tactical ones. This shows the ambiguity and secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons 
arsenals. Another argument has been that the Soviet threat changed that year, when the USSR 
collapsed in December 1991. Even though 2,000 nuclear weapons were withdrawn, the door 
was supposedly left open to restore or redeploy naval nuclear weapons at ‘an appropriate 
time’. The storage facilities for the nuclear weapons have also been preserved. The United 
States has furthermore pledged that the ROK is under its nuclear umbrella12. The DPRK on 
the other hand has never fallen under either the Soviet or the Chinese nuclear umbrella (Jae-
Bong, 2009, p. 12).  
  
                                                 
10 The nuclear weapons that the United States. had planned to deploy to South Korea were 280 mm atomic 
cannons and 762 mm Honest John atomic rockets. These two types had been removed from other use due to their 
weight and size (Jae-Bong, 2009, p. 5) 
11 START outlined the reduction of the United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals by one third of current levels 
(Jae-Bong, 2009, p. 12).  
12 The term ”nuclear umbrella” refers to a guarantee by a nuclear weapons state, in this instance the United 
States, to defend a non-nuclear allied state, in this case South Korea, with nuclear weapons (Jae-Bong, 2009, p. 
12).  
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3 Theories 
This chapter will give a short introduction to the theories surrounding nuclear deterrence.  It 
will explain which terms that have laid the foundation for effective deterrence. By setting up 
standards for what must be present for effective deterrence, the theories also say something 
about when they will fail. It also shows how the basic features of the international system 
show how states interact with each other. It will be important to look at how states relate to 
threats posed by other states, and how deterrence can be a solution to such a threat. 
Deterrence as a strategy implies that the implications the theory lays to ground are present. 
The chapter will look at how deterrence strategy works and what the implications of this 
strategy are, and its ability to succeed if this is not the case? This central question is carried on 
out through the discussion on nuclear deterrence in relation to the DPRK that is presented 
later.  
3.1 Political Realism  
Classical deterrence theory is rooted in the intellectual tradition that is known as power 
politics, political realism or realpolitik which are all known to be a part of realism (Zagare & 
Kilgour, 2000, p. 7). Jon Elster (1986, p. 4) states that there are three basic concepts of 
rationality, beliefs, desires and actions. A person has beliefs about the casual structures of a 
situation he or she is in. He or she also has beliefs about what course of action that will lead to 
the different outcomes. The desires are subjective rankings of the alternative courses of action 
he or she believes are possible. To act rationally, then, simply means to choose the most 
favorable course of action according to one´s desires (ibid). Rational choice theory tells a 
person how to achieve a wanted outcome as best as possible. It does not tell a person whether 
or not desires should be material, spiritual, symbolic, altruistic or egoistic. Rational desires 
must however minimally comply with two formal criteria; transitivity and time-consistency 
(ibid).  
Posits egoistic, rational, and undifferentiated units are driven by their nature to maximize 
power (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 18), or by their environment to maximize security (Waltz, 
1979), but since rationality is defined subjectively makes it difficult to predict how another 
state will perform or reject to something. According to a realist is the international system 
lacking a supreme authority. Each state must provide for its own security and most realists 
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believe that a balance of power is the most efficient mean to maintain world order. 
Mearsheimer (1990, p. 18) writes that, “Power inequalities invite war by increasing the 
potential for successful aggression; hence war is minimized when inequalities are least”. 
Classical deterrence theory builds upon this theoretical base and is extended when it considers 
the consequences of war in a nuclear world and age (Zagare & Kilgour, 2000, p. 8).  
Rationality and rational conduct is an efficient conduct in the sense that the actors most 
effectively pursue their desires. The minimalist view of rationality is that people choose what 
they want the most, supposing only that their preferences are consistent. This is a view that is 
by some perceived as extremely trivial and scarcely worth of such a grandiose description as 
‘rational choice’. There are however two aspects to rationality in this sense. First, there is the 
question of analyzing an individual’s preferences and ensuring his or hers consistency, this is 
not always as easy as it may seem. Secondly there is the question of ‘rational belief’; an 
individual must have some rational belief concerning the possible consequences of any act. 
Decisions are typically taken under uncertain environments, this involves being aware of a 
number of possibilities (Nicholson, 1992, p. 48). “Decision makers, even of the highest and 
most distinguished sort, are human beings, and are subject to the same vagaries of the mind as 
the rest of us” (Nicholson, 1992, p. 127).  
A single demand of you comrades…Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest 
possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has 
been destroyed. Provide the bomb, it will remove a great danger from us (Thayer, 
1995, p. 487).  
This was Josef Stalin reported request to Igor Kurchatov and B.L. Yannikov after The United 
States bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. According to Sagan (1996, p. 58) 
was the Soviet response a perfectly predictable response from a realist perspective. It can also 
be argued that the decision of other states to develop nuclear weapons can be explained within 
the same framework. From a realist perspective have Great Britain and France developed 
nuclear weapons because of a growing Soviet military threat. When the credibility of the 
United States nuclear guarantee to NATO allies was questioned the USSR was able to 
threaten retaliation against the United States. Some states started to question whether or not 
the United States would actually use nuclear weapons to protect them if it could jeopardize 
the American situation. China developed the bomb because the country felt vulnerable by the 
United States at the end of the Korean War and during the Taiwan Straits crises. After China 
19 
 
had successfully developed a nuclear bomb, India was bound to follow. They had fought a 
war with China in 1962. After the India’s successful explosion, the Pakistani nuclear program 
moved forward according to a realist view because they were facing a recently hostile 
neighbor who was superior when it came to conventional military power as well as nuclear 
power (Sagan, 1996, p. 59). The DPRK developed nuclear weapons in order to deter and repel 
aggression and attacks against their country; they felt threatened by the presence of American 
nuclear weapons in the ROK (Lewis, 2010).  From a realist perspective these states developed 
nuclear weapons because they felt threatened by neighboring states or enemies with nuclear 
capabilities.  
3.2 The Structure of the International System   
Kenneth N. Waltz attempts in his doctoral thesis “Man, the State, and War” to give a more 
precise explanation of state’s behavior and this thesis developed into a strand of realism 
known as structural realism or neorealism. Waltz’s focus was on the structure of the 
international system (P. Huth, Gelpi, & Bennett, 1993, p. 611).   
National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics 
is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation and every state will plot out a 
course by force or not, that they believe will best serve their interests (Waltz, 1979, p. 113). A 
national system is not one of self-help, but the international system is. A big difference 
between national and international politics is not dependent on the use of force, but on the 
different mode of organization for doing something about it. The threat of violence and the 
recurrent use of force do also distinguish international from national politics. The use of force, 
or the constant fear of its use, is not sufficient grounds for distinguishing international from 
domestic affairs (Waltz, 1979, pp. 102–104). The structure of international politics limits the 
cooperation among states because a state worries about a division of possible gains that may 
favor other more than itself. A state will also worry unless it becomes dependent on other 
states through cooperative activities and an exchange of goods and services (Waltz, 1979, p. 
106). 
Kenneth N. Waltz is a realist and represents one strand of realism, today there are several 
such strands, but what they all have in common are some assumptions and beliefs about 
states, the international system and the interaction between the two.  
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1) The international system is anarchic. This means that there is no overreaching 
government, and states have to ultimately fend for themselves.  
2) Sovereign states are the principle actors in world politics.  
3) States are unitary rational actors and their own national interests guide them. 
4) The ultimate national interest of every state is state survival. 
5) Power is what determines a state’s capability and is also the currency of the 
international system (power is commonly known as military power, which is 
determined, by economic strength and demographics) (Ganss, 2012, p. 15).  
3.2.1 An Anarchic International System 
Realism believes that the principal actors in the international system are sovereign states. To 
be a sovereign state means that there is no higher authority than the states’ that dictate how 
the states choose to act within its own borders. This principal was established by the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. No state is allowed to interfere in another states’ domestic affairs 
(Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 306–307). Due to the fact that there is no higher authority, the 
international system is anarchic. This means that there is no international authority that can 
force states to act in a certain way or punish them if they do not act as wanted. Because no 
states know the exact intentions of another state and since there are no higher authority it 
means that states will always live in uncertainty in relations to each other.  
3.2.2 Unitary Rational Actors  
The ultimate national interest of every state is survival. Each state must therefore secure this. 
This also means that all foreign policy decisions have to be formed after this basic idea. The 
actor knows which goal he or she is trying to achieve. He or she also knows the alternatives to 
reach the goal. He or she will calculate the expected utility of all the alternatives and choose 
the one alternative that maximizes the utility (Ganss, 2012, p. 16). This is a classic example of 
game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma. A nuclear arms offer an important example of the 
dilemma because if two states are involved in an arms race both of them are better off when 
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they cooperate and avoid building up nuclear weapons. Yet the dominant strategy for each is 
to arm itself heavily (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982).  
3.2.3 Power 
Kenneth Waltz wrote “international politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of 
accommodation”. This has resulted in an unstable world according to Waltz and the stability 
of the international world is depended on the balance of power because states will abstain 
from directly military confrontations with states that have superior strength and power (Waltz 
2008, 79). The only way a sovereign state can survive in an anarchic world is to maximize its 
power. In neorealism, power is a means to an end. It is also a source to security and 
insecurity. Too much power can result in other states increasing their arms, which can lead to 
an arms race. Too little power on the other hand can invite more powerful states to attack 
(Waltz 2008, 79).  
There are two dominant realist approaches in relation to power and its role in the interaction 
between states. The first tradition is called the billiard ball metaphor. According to this theory 
is the international system solely composed of states. This means that there is no external 
environment. States in this system are interested in maximizing their power, and power is 
viewed as a relative concept. When one state increases its power capabilities it will 
unavoidably decrease the capability of other states. In this image is the world zero-sum. States 
only act to structure nonpolitical behavior if this would enhance their relative power 
capability, this means that economic policy is not an end in itself; it is a device for enhancing 
a state’s power. This approach dominated international relations and realism through the 
1960s, when security concerns and Soviet-American and Cold War relations were at the 
center of attention  (Krasner, 1982, pp. 497–498). The second realist tradition represents a 
more complicated universe than the billiard ball metaphor. This tradition is interested in the 
impact of the distribution of state power on some external environment. The interaction of 
states can structure the pattern of world trade or the rules governing the exploitation of deep 
seabed nodules. Conflict is not ignored in this tradition, but the world is not zero-sum like the 
first tradition. In contrast to the first tradition is relative power capabilities not the only state 
objective; economic wealth, for instance, can be an end in itself (ibid). 
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3.3 Deterrence Theory 
Deterrence theory is not an invention of the nuclear age but it is a rational theory that was 
developed during the Cold War arms race. Its focus was the prevention of a nuclear conflict 
between the USSR and the United States. There is no single and authoritative theory, so in 
order to outline classical deterrence theory one has to piece together a variety of sources 
(Zagare & Kilgour, 2000, p. 7). Deterrence is broadly defined as “…the threat of force 
intended to convince a potential aggressor not to undertake a particular action because the 
cost will be unacceptable or the probability of success extremely low” (Gerson, 2009, p. 34). 
The Political Science encyclopedia (2007, p. 21) has a very similar definition to Gerson. 
According to the encyclopedia is the meaning behind deterrence to get “…somebody to 
refrain from something by threatening them with negative responses. This is especially used 
by states to endeavor to hold other states from an unwanted action by proposing military 
threats”. This definition of deterrence is wide, but for deterrence to be effective the opposition 
has to be convinced that the other part has the ability and will to respond to aggressive 
actions, in other words, deterrence has to be believable. This directly links to research 
question a and b and will be a big part of the analysis. This definition also introduces the 
aspect of military threats. Potential attackers need to be convinced that their provocation will 
be met with retaliation. Thus A's deterrence capability is a result of B's estimation of A's 
nuclear weapons and intention. If the capability is there, but the intention or willingness to 
repay is equal to 0, then the deterrent effect is also equal to 0 (Holsti, 1995, p. 221). It is 
important to keep in mind that deterrence is not achieved through the ability to defend, but 
through the ability to punish and attack. Pure deterrent forces provide no defense (Sagan & 
Waltz, 1995, p. 3).  
Huth, Gelpi and Bennett (1993, p. 612) writes that “in order for deterrence to succeed, the 
challenger’s expected utility for accepting the status quo must be greater than its expected 
utility for attempting to overturn the status quo through the use of force”. As shown by Huth 
et.al above deterrence contains both ability and credibility. The deterring party has to have the 
ability to impose high cost on their opponent, and the opining party has to perceive that the 
deterring party is willing to do what they say they will (ibid). Credibility again is a result of 
two central variables: the balance of military capability between challenger and defender as 
well as challenger and defender’s level of resolve. The balance of the capabilities influences 
the challenger’s probability of victory along with the value it places on a victory or defeat in a 
23 
 
war-like situation. If the balance of military capability shifts towards the challenger then it 
will be more likely that they will be able to triumph in an armed conflict (ibid). Nuclear 
weapons on the other hand can change all of this because they “…make military 
miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent predictions easy” (Sagan & Waltz, 1995, p. 
9).  
3.4 Conditions for Successful Deterrence  
Deterrence is a very important factor when discussing the importance of nuclear weapons in a 
conflict, but by setting up standards for what must be present for effective deterrence, the 
theory also says when it will fail because deterrence do not work automatically. The obvious 
requirement for effective nuclear deterrence is the possession of sufficient capabilities to carry 
out the threat posed (Holsti, 1977, p. 315). According to Tom Sauer (1998, p. 3) nuclear 
deterrence have to fulfill three basic conditions. These are (1) The opponent must be 
susceptible to deterrence, (2) the opponent must have vital interest and (3) the declared 
nuclear threat must be believable.  
Holsti (1995, p. 220) elaborates Sauer’s three conditions and introduces six instead of three 
conditions which are more thorough:  
1) Decisions by both the defender and the challenger will be based on rational 
calculations of probable costs and gains, accurate evaluations of the situation, and 
careful assessments of relative capabilities.  
2) A high level of threat, such as that posed by nuclear weapons inhibits rather than 
provokes aggressive behavior.  
3) The value hierarchies of both the defender and the challenger are similar, at least to 
the point that each places to the avoidance of large scale violence at or near the top.  
4) Both sides have similar frames of reference so that signals of resolve and reassurance 
are perceived and interpreted accurately.  
5) Decisions are not sensitive to such extraneous considerations as domestic political 
pressure.  
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6) Both sides maintain tight centralized control over decisions that might involve or 
provoke the use of strategic weapons. 
As one can see, are these quite rigorous conditions for effective deterrence. It requires rational 
actors who have certain interests in common. Rationality alone is not enough. The parties 
must also have a common preference to avoid mutual nuclear exchange. The last two points 
also assumes that the actors are unitary rational actors. The next section elaborates on Sauer 
and Holsti’s conditions for successful deterrence.  Holsti’s six conditions are divided into 
Sauer’s three categories due to the fact that some of them coincide.  
3.4.1 State Decision Makers Must be Deterred  
There are three different categories of individuals that are less likely to be deterred than 
others; these are, (1) irrational individuals, (2) fundamentalists and (3) risk-takers. States are 
the only actors, but there are individuals within the various states that make decisions and the 
section that follows refer to individuals instead of states even though states are the only actors 
in the international arena.  
A person has to be aware of the consequences of one’s behavior to be deterred which means 
to assess the costs and benefits of one’s action. According to Sauer (1998, p. 4) do rational 
actors show this characteristic. Supporters of nuclear deterrence believe that a rational 
opponent will figure out the negative consequences of a nuclear counterattack because such 
an actor will realize that a counterattack cancels out the possible advantages of any action 
against the vital interests of those actors that possess nuclear weapons. An irrational actor on 
the other hand will not automatically follow this logic; an example of an irrational actor is one 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs and/or medication. If an actor is under excessive use 
then he/she will in most cases not be able to act rationally. The likely hood of such a person 
becoming head of state is higher than one first would believe (ibid).  
Fundamentalists are more willing than others to risk others as well as their own lives for 
ideological or religious interests (Sauer, 1998, p. 4). Gregory Schulte, the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Director at the time agrees with Sauer. He stated, “It may be difficult to assess the 
personality and intentions of the leaders of proliferating states. We might even consider these 
leaders to be ‘irrational’, at least by our standards” (Gregory Schulte, 1995, p. 18). These 
leaders that Sauer classify as fundamentalists value life differently than by the ‘western 
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standard’, and this has massive consequences when it comes to nuclear deterrence and 
proliferation. Deterrence which is based on rational actors will not be able to stop a ‘nuclear 
kamikaze” (Sauer, 1998, p. 5).  
The third categories of actors are risk-takers, and this is the largest category to worry about 
according to Tom Sauer. A lot of different categories of people can be classified as risk-
takers, but not everyone is willing to take massive risks. The risk-takers in this category play 
at the edge of rationality. To carry out an attack involves to calculating risks and these 
calculations sometimes becomes miscalculations (Sauer, 1998, p. 5). Supporters of nuclear 
deterrence theories argue that the possibilities of nuclear miscalculations are minimal, but the 
possibility of miscalculations can never be excluded. So-called nuclear risk-takers could be 
individuals, but by small groups. This on the other hand is, according to Sauer, not a valid 
enough counter argument for his three categories. A small group of people will not 
necessarily make rational decisions. A group leader with fundamentalist’s views will not 
surround him or herself with people with opposite religious or ideological principles. There is 
also a likelihood that regimes who have to make decisions on whether or not to react to a 
deterrence threat are autocratic regimes where no opposition is allowed (Sauer, 1998, p. 6). 
Organizations as well as humans are disposed to misjudge a situation and make a completely 
wrong decision. The chances of decisions being taken in non-rational environments increase 
due to the structure of organizations. Even in a democratic regime and especially in an 
unordinary crisis situation are leaders and their staff no longer able to make joint rational 
decisions (ibid). Irving Janis (Hart, 1991, p. 256) defines it as "a mode of thinking that people 
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings 
for unanimity”. Authors like Kenneth Waltz (1979) argue that the nature of a political regime 
or the characteristics of an individual not affect nuclear deterrence when a credible nuclear 
arsenal deters an actor because a vast majority of individuals and groups making decisions are 
rational. The risk of nuclear deterrence failing due to miscalculations can never be excluded 
and the possibility of nuclear deterrence failing has always existed and still does (Sauer, 1998, 
p. 8).  
3.4.2 Vital Interest must be Threatened 
According to Sauer (1998, pp. 8–9) the vital interest of a state have to be threatened before 
one can speak of nuclear deterrence. What one defines a vital interest is a complicated issue; 
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some issues may be vital, while others may be less vital. It is also known that states have 
altered their opinion of their own vital issues during the course of a conflict (Cohen, 1994, p. 
161). Advocates of nuclear deterrence perceive this point as contributing to the stabilizing 
effect of nuclear weapons because no one will be willing to take the risk. Critics of deterrence 
on the other hand states that not everybody will look at vital interest in that sense (Sauer, 
1998, pp. 8–9).  
3.4.3 A Threat has to be Credible  
A threat is a liable declaration that signals an intention to hurt somebody unless that 
somebody acts in the way that the threatened wants to. The hurt inflicted on someone can be 
physically, economically, or otherwise and can also be inflicted directly or indirectly on the 
target (Hovi, 1998, p. 12). The first means to literally hurt the target itself. The second means 
to hurt a third party that the target cares about. A warning on the other hand is a statement 
which points out to somebody that taking a particular course or doing something special can 
lead to unfortunate consequences, and these consequences are not under the control of the 
person making the statement (Hovi, 1998, p. 12). Both a threat and a warning both claim that 
taking a particular course of action will more than likely cause harm to the person considering 
that action. The difference between the two is that harm will be inflicted by the one 
threatening when it comes to a threat and when it comes to a warning it is inflicted by nature 
or a third party (Hovi, 1998, p. 12). A threat can be considered effective if the one targeted 
changes its behavior in accordance with the threatener’s wishes.  
Five conditions have to be fulfilled for a threat to be considered effective. The first condition 
is relevance; a threat must have an impact on the outcome. This requires that the target of the 
threat have freedom of action. He/she is able to adjust his/hers policy in the direction that the 
threatener wants. The target must also have an incentive to act contrary to the threatener’s 
desires, if not, then the target would behave in accordance with these desires in any case, and 
there would be no need to threaten him/her (Hovi, 1998, pp. 13–16). The second condition is 
severity. A threat must be so severe that it makes a difference to the target. The target must 
prefer to submit with the threatener’s demands, instead of defying these demands and have 
the threat effectuated. Whether a threat is sufficiently severe enough depends on the 
magnitude of the threatened punishment as well as on the character of the demands made by 
the threatener.  
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Credibility is the third condition and a threat has to be credible to the extent that the target 
believes that it will be carried out if the target does not comply with the threatener (ibid). 
Freedman (1981, p. 96) once stated that credibility is “the magic” ingredient of deterrence. 
Kilgour and Zagare has stated (1991, p. 305) that “never has this statement been more true 
than in the nuclear age when the capability of each superpower to inflict unacceptable damage 
on the other is evident”. In the strategic culture the idea of credibility is either directly or in-
directly associated with rational or self-interested behavior. A credible threat is a threat that is 
believed. Threats can be believed when they are rational to carry out. In other words, only 
rational threats are credible (Kilgour & Zagare, 1991, p. 307). If the target knows with 
certainty that the threat will not be carried out then it do not matter how severe it is. The 
probability of a threat being carried out is never a fraction; it is always one or zero (Hovi, 
1998, pp. 13–16). What constitutes a rational threat depends on how rationality is defined. A 
credible threat is one that the threatener would prefer to execute at the time it is to be 
executed. An actor will prefer to execute a threat when the expected worth of doing so 
surpasses the expected worth of failing to do so, otherwise would the threat be irrational and 
then incredible (Kilgour & Zagare, 1991, pp. 307–308). A threat also has to be complete and 
it will be when the target believes that if he/she complies with the threatener’s desires, then 
the threat will not be put into effect. The fifth and final condition is clarity. The target of a 
threat must understand the point that the threatener tries to convey to the target and it also 
must be clear what exactly the threatener want. It is also required that the target understand 
what consequences will be if he/she refuses to comply with the threat (Hovi, 1998, pp. 13–
16). 
3.5 Extended Nuclear Deterrence 
The deterrence theories presented above are the most common deterrence theories where the 
focus is on deterring an attack against one self, but this is not the only deterrence strategy. 
The term extended deterrence means examples where a party wished to deter an attack by a 
second party against one or more third party(ies). Extended deterrence generally refers to 
nuclear deterrence and it applies principally to Europe through the NATO nuclear umbrella 
and the five countries hosting the United States nuclear weapons on their soil as part of a 
NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement (Stein, 1987, p. 326). It is relevant and important to look 
at what the differences between classical deterrence theory and extended deterrence theory 
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are. It is also important to look at the implications these differences have. P. K. Huth (1990, p. 
272) writes that the credibility of extended deterrence depends upon whether or not the 
potential attacker believes that the defender possess “(1) military capabilities sufficient to 
inflict substantial military costs on the attacker in the event of armed conflict; and (2) whether 
the defender would actually use those capabilities if an ally was attacked” (ibid). The aspect 
of credibility when it comes to extended deterrence is a serious issue. Thomas Schelling 
explains what the difference between credibility in deterrence and extended deterrence are 
and why there is a difference: “The difference between national homeland and everything 
“abroad” is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and 
the threats that have to be made credible” (Schelling, 1966, p. 36). It is much clearer that one 
is willing to fight for one’s own country and government, it is not so clear that one will fight 
for someone else’s land, especially if it jeopardizes one’s own homeland (ibid).  
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4 Methodology and Research Design 
This thesis is a qualitative case study about the deterrence effect DPRK’s nuclear weapons 
have today. This study uses deterrence theory to identify and analyze key concepts in order to 
explain and predict changes in the independent variable on the dependent variable, and can 
therefore be classified as a deductive study (Bryman, 2008, p. 9). It uses the theoretical 
perspectives, presented in Chapter 3, to shed light on the DPRK as an empirical case. 
According to Levy’s (2008, p. 4) typology of case studies can this study be classified as a 
theory-guided case study. By using different theories do the study aim to get a better 
understanding of DPRK’s nuclear weapons deterrent credibility toward the United States and 
the ROK.  
4.1 The Research Process 
Specific theoretical frameworks are used to analyze empirical findings. The research has been 
divided into several stages. This chapter is organized in accordance to the different research 
stages (see figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 The Research Process  
 
 
 
4.1.1 Stage 1: Preliminary Research  
The reason why this thesis focuses on nuclear weapons, deterrence and the DPRK is because 
of experiences attained as a volunteer and campaigner with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Preliminary research 
was conducted during this engagement. Fellow campaigners and staff at the NPA head office 
suggested writing a master thesis about nuclear weapons. Participation on several conferences 
relating to nuclear weapons questions was conducted, among others as a delegate for NPA at 
the ICAN Civil Society Forum in Oslo, 2-3 March and the Conference on the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear weapons in Oslo, 4-5 March 2013. Several months were spent 
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investigating a possible angle and research question for this master thesis. Contact with the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) was established in July 2013, and two 
supervisors were assigned to this thesis; Hege Schultz Heireng and Steinar Høibråten, in 
August of the same year. They have provided relevant theoretical and background 
information for this study.  
4.1.2 Stage 2: Research Design and Literature Review  
This stage of the process involved choosing a research design and reviewing secondary 
literature. A research design is “a plan that shows, through a discussion of our model and 
data, how we expect to use evidence to make inferences” (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 
118). This study is a qualitative case study with an intensive research design. 
The definition of a case study depends on the scholar defining it. John Gerring (2007, p. 37) 
has stated it is “an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (cases), for the 
purpose of understanding a large class of similar units (a population of cases)”. Alan Bryman 
seems to agree with this, he believes that a case study is “[…] the detailed and intensive 
analysis of a single case” (Bryman, 2008, p. 52). In this specific study is the DPRK the unit 
being studied and the DPRK is again a member of the population consisting of the eight or 
nine states that possess nuclear weapons. George and Bennett (2005, p. 5) on the other hand 
has a slightly different definition than Gerring and Bryman. According to them is a case study 
“the detailed examination of an aspect of an historical episode to develop or test an historical 
explanation that may be generalizable to other events”. They introduce the aspect of 
generalization as a goal when conducting a case study, but the aspect of generalizability is one 
that is highly debated among scholars. This is due to the fact that relationships identified in 
one or a few cases might not be present in other cases. Making generalization based on a 
single case is problematic. The primary goal of this thesis is not generalization, but to get a 
deep insight and understanding of the DPRK. There is no way of knowing for sure if the 
relationships identified in this study are present in the seven or eight other states that possess 
nuclear weapons without testing the other cases as well. Case study research can contribute to 
generalization by identifying casual relationships in one or a small number of cases that can 
be tested over a large sample of cases. This may lead to what George and Bennett  (2005, p. 
31) calls “cumulatively contingent generalization”. 
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Gerring (2007, 88) writes that a single case is part of a larger universe or population of cases. 
A case is chosen from a larger population and “the reasons for this choice hinge upon the way 
in which it is situated within that population” (ibid: 88-90). The population in this is a small 
population that share several similarities, but is important to remember that these states also 
are a heterogeneous population.  
Literature Review 
A review of information written about the DPRK, its nuclear weapons program, nuclear 
weapons deterrent effect as well as theoretical frameworks was conducted during this part of 
the research process. A more narrow focus was applied when the DPRK was decided on as 
the case to be studied. The initial plan was to write about all the eight or nine states that 
possess nuclear weapons, but it became apparent that this would be too extensive.  
Keohane, Verba and King (1994, p. 15) outlines two main criteria’s that a scientific research 
question needs to satisfy (1): “a research project should pose a question that is “important” in 
the real world and (2) “A research project should make a specific contribution to an 
identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified 
scientific explanations of some aspect in the world” (ibid). 
The research question in this thesis embodies why a state wishes to acquire and why it 
chooses to hold on to its nuclear weapons through its focus on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear 
weapons deterrent effect is used as an argument to why a state needs these types of weapons, 
and this is definitely an aspect that is important in the real world. The DPRK was not chosen 
because it is an extreme or unique case. There are only eight or nine states that possess 
nuclear weapons and they can all be perceived as extreme and unique in their own ways. This 
thesis’ research question is chosen because it is a field of deterrence that is under-studied. 
This makes the DPRK in this thesis an exemplifying case. According to R.K. Yin in (Bryman, 
2008, p. 56) is an exemplifying case’ objective “[…] to capture the circumstances and 
conditions of an everyday life or commonplace situation”. The aim of this thesis is not to 
improve the deterrence theories presented in Chapter 3, but to use the theories to say 
something meaningful in relation to the research question. The study is guided by an 
interpretive epistemological position which means that “[…] the stress is on the understanding 
of the social world by an examination of the world by its participants (Bryman, 2008, p. 366). 
Throughout this stage of the research process has the focus been on critically analyzing the 
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documents and theories due to the fact that most sources “have an intended purpose” and are 
colored by the authors views (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 199). Reliability when conducting 
literature review is important. Reliability measures the precision and replicability of a study. 
It means that the higher the reliability the more confident can one expect the measuring 
instrument to give the same result when the exact same measurement is repeated on the same 
object a second time (King et al., 1994, pp. 25–26). To secure this in the study have data 
triangulation and cross-referencing been used (Hellevik, 2002).  
4.1.3 Stage 3: Constructing Interview Guides and Semi-
Structured Elite Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews is according to Bryman (2008, p. 321) a flexible process in which 
the researcher uses an interview guide, but is also free to ask follow-up questions and 
introduce new topics that the respondent is interested in. Semi-structured interviews can be 
used to gather descriptions along predefined variables, which is what this thesis intends to do. 
A focus on the interview objects ‘perspectives and context is very important in such 
interviews (ibid). Stage 2 and 3 worked as preparation and research for creating the interview 
guide. The guide as whole and individual questions has been discussed with both supervisors 
before being finalized and asked to the respondents. Every question has been thoroughly 
thought through in terms of the wording and understanding of the question, but also possible 
answers the respondents may give.  It is also important to keep in mind that this process can 
result in preconceived notions by the interviewer on how a respondent will reply to a 
question. Being aware of this fact is important in such a process. The interview guide was also 
adjusted to each respondent based on the insight and information they could and would 
contribute with.  
Semi-Structured Elite Interviews 
Elite interviews were chosen as a scientific method for several reasons. (1) Key respondents 
have extra knowledge and familiarity with the topic (Andersen, 2006, p. 279). This is an 
important aspect because very little information is publically known about DPRK’s nuclear 
weapons program. Experts can give an insight that is not possible to acquire from secondary 
literature sources. (2) As stated earlier most of what is known about DPRK’s nuclear program 
is based on insecure intelligence sources and information from defectors who might have had 
a personal interest in portraying the situation as more severe and dramatic than it actually is. It 
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is important to critically assess the content of the data one has collected because it is not 
necessarily in the interest of the respondent or source of information to be objective and tell 
the truth (Berry, 2002, p. 680) and elite interviews figures as a form of source triangulations. 
The respondents interviewed do not have the same interest as detectors when it comes to 
portraying the DPRK and its nuclear weapons program. 
When semi-structured interviews are conducted is there often inadequate information about 
selection of participants, transcription and processing of data, this is why reliability and 
validity is criticized when it comes to semi-structured and unstructured interviews. This has 
resulted in a specific consciousness about choices made in relation to the process of gathering 
and transcribing the information gathered during interview in order to make the study as 
transparent as possible. Some scholars argue that all research is “explicitly or implicitly 
informed by the experiences, aims and interpretations of the researcher” (Flowerdew & 
Martin, 2013, p. 112). This is especially the case for the type of interviews conducted in this 
study. In-debt studies are often criticized because an interviewer’s bias can affect the 
respondent’s answers and that they therefore are not objective (ibid). Awareness of this fact 
was made and kept it in mind when conducting interviews, but it is difficult to attain complete 
objectivity in social science research.  
Three elite interviews were conducted for this thesis. The respondents were chosen closely in 
collaboration with both of the advisors for this thesis. Sverre Lodgaard which is a Norwegian 
Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo 
was interviewed first. Sverre Lodgaard was chosen because he has worked with deterrence 
and proliferation questions since the 1970s and has written several acclaimed books and 
articles about themes discussed in this thesis. The interview with Sverre Lodgaard was 
conducted at his office in Oslo and took approximately one hour. The interview was taped 
with Sverre Lodgaard’s knowledge and approval. The second interview was conducted with 
James M. Acton; he is a Senior Associate at the Nuclear Policy Program at Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. James M. Acton is a physicist by training, but has great 
knowledge of political relationships and specializes in nonproliferation, deterrence, and 
disarmament. The interview with James M. Acton was conducted over the phone because he 
works and lives in Washington D.C. The interview also took about an hour and was taped 
with James M. Acton’s knowledge and consent. The third and final interview was with a 
diplomat who has several years of firsthand experience with Korean politics and this 
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interview was conducted face to face and lasted just over an hour. The interview was taped 
with the diplomat’s knowledge and consent. The third person being interviewed wished to 
remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the data. Citations that are published without 
names can decrease the validity because the study becomes more difficult to replicate. On the 
other hand the respondent would have held information back if he or she knew his or hers 
name would be published in the text. One can therefore argue validity was increased because 
more information was obtained during this specific interview, which is essential for the 
analysis and the thesis as a whole. Citations were sent to all three respondents for approval 
before publishing, which was a condition for being allowed to use names in the text. This 
increases validity because possible inaccuracies and misunderstandings get cleared up before 
publishing of the thesis. A positive self-representation of one’s own role and organization is a 
common problem in elite interviews. Keeping aware of this fact when conducting interviews 
are very important, but triangulation of information can help with this problem (Berry, 2002, 
p. 680). This means that elite interviews are combined with secondary literature and checked 
up against each other to make sure that the information provided in this thesis is as objective 
as it can. When information portrayed is that of the respondents it is stated and made very 
clear during the text.  
4.1.4 Stage 4: Transcription  
Transcription of the different interviews was an important part of the research process. Notes 
were taken during all three interviews, but a recording of the conversations also took place to 
make sure that no information was lost. Recording and transcription turned out to be a very 
useful tool because a lot of the information used in the analysis was obtained and understood 
during transcription process. After the publication of this thesis, will the three transcriptions, 
recordings and information that can indicate the diplomat’s identity be anonymized and 
deleted.  
4.2 Limitations and Strengths of the Research 
Design 
Reliability measures the precision and replicability of a study.  This can be difficult to obtain 
in a qualitative case study like this because perfect reliability is not possible to accomplish 
when studying humans and social phenomenon. This is because of the simple fact that people 
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change, interact and are affected by the first research. This means that it is impossible to get 
the exact same results a second time even if there are no random measurement errors (Sumner 
& Tribe, 2008, p. 114). A semi-structured interview setting will be especially difficult to 
copy. The reliability of a study is not only dependent on how the data was collected, but also 
on how the data is interpreted and used. Thoroughly describing the research process in detail, 
in combination with being as transparent as possible in relation to which documents and 
information the analysis is based upon, have taken place in order to overcome these reliability 
issues. The most important measure to strengthen the reliability is to “report how the data 
were created and how we came to possess them”. This is because it makes it possible for other 
researchers to assess the methodological choices and interpretations done by the researcher in 
charge (King et al., 1994, p. 51).  
Validity was especially important when it came to the interview guide. Concept validity is 
concerned with whether one is actually measuring what one intends to measure. Concept 
validity is considered high if the operationalized variables cover all aspects of the concept at 
hand, and nothing more than that (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). The questions were 
written and asked in a manner so that they only captured the concepts that are measured in the 
thesis. An interviewer is supposed to be critical and have analytical control in order to 
improve validity and reliability of study (Andersen, 2006, p. 2). The statements given by the 
respondents during the interviews were therefore critically viewed afterwards. This is because 
it can be risky for a researcher to just blindly accept the perspectives portrayed by a 
respondent. A researcher’s job is to put the interpretations of a respondent in a larger context 
and identify possible broader patterns and structures not easily seen by others (Skog, 2004, p. 
267).  All three respondents were very good at clarifying when an opinion was their own or 
someone else’s. It did not come across as the respondents having an agenda other that 
showing and explaining their own views regarding the issues discussed in this thesis.  
A methodological strength with this study is that single case studies (or a small number of 
cases) are considered to have stronger internal validity compared to other non-experimental 
designs. Single case studies allow in-depth studies of the process and identification of the 
casual mechanisms that connects the causes to the effects (Gerring, 2007, p. 43) (George & 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 21–22). This is what this thesis would like to accomplish and the reason 
for why the DPRK was chosen as the single case to be studied. A methodological challenge 
on the other hand was to determine the potential for generalization to the broader population 
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of states that possess nuclear weapons. External validity measures to what extent it is possible 
to make non-statistical generalizations to and across individuals, times and places with a 
reasonable degree of certainty (Lund, 2002, p. 121). Studies of a single case (or a small 
number of cases as in this study) are considered to have low external validity. One studies 
only one or a few units and it is therefore difficult to know how representative they are for the 
rest of the universe of cases (Lijphart, 1975). There is a trade-off between the detailed and 
rich explication of one specific case, and parsimony and broad applicability of theories 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 31).  
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5 How to Measure North Korean 
Deterrence Credibility 
5.1 Ability and Will  
The research question of this thesis is: how are the United States and the ROK disposed to 
DPRK’s nuclear deterrence? This question looks into whether or not deterrence works, and is 
again divided into two parts a) are DPRK’s nuclear threats towards the United States and the 
ROK credible? And b) are the United States and the ROK’s vital interests exposed to DPRK’s 
deterrence? The main research question is divided in accordance with deterrence theories 
presented in Chapter 3. This chapter will be a presentation and explanation of the following 
three analysis chapters.  
Research question a looks at threat credibility because a threat has to be credible to work. A 
threat is according to theory presented in Section 3.3 a warning of the use of force intended to 
convince a potential aggressor not to undertake a particular action because the cost will be 
unacceptable or the probability of success extremely low. This thesis operationalizes the 
warning of force, meaning both oral and written threats directed at the states studied here 
along with nuclear actions conducted by the DPRK. This means that all written and oral 
threats, as well as DPRK’s nuclear actions discussed in this thesis, are perceived as threats. 
Five conditions also have to be present according to Section 3.4.3 in order for a threat to be 
considered effective. These conditions are; relevance, severity, credibility, completeness and 
clarity.  
The focus in this thesis is on the credibility condition because the DPRK must have both the 
ability and the willingness to attack another country with nuclear weapons for its nuclear 
deterrence to be considered credible, and the two aspects need to be present at the same time. 
That is why credibility is defined by the two terms: ability and will. Sufficient definitions of 
the two terms do not exist, and this thesis therefore defines nuclear weapons ability as the 
possession of the means or the skills to make, maintain and use nuclear weapons, and it 
defines the will to use nuclear weapons as having the willingness to carry out a given nuclear 
threat. Completeness of a threat is covered by the two aspects defining credibility because for 
a threat to be complete, the DPRK needs to have both the ability and the will to attack another 
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country with nuclear weapons. Clarity will also be indirectly discussed in the answer to 
research question a because coming chapters will discuss the United States and the Republic 
of Korea’s responses to North Korean nuclear threats. How these two states have reacted to 
North Korean nuclear behavior and incidents will show if the North Korean nuclear threat is 
perceived as clear by the two other states.  
Nuclear weapons are the most severe weapons in existence today. One nuclear weapon can 
kill several hundred thousand people in one instant and result in irreversible damage to the 
environment. Along with being severe, nuclear weapons must remain relevant for the 
security challenges not only for the states possessing nuclear weapons, but also for the rest of 
the world. Nuclear weapons and North Korean nuclear weapons in particular, are regularly 
discussed in international press and international organizations. The UNSC has imposed 
several sanctions on the DPRK due to its nuclear weapons program. The severity and 
relevance of these weapons is obvious and globally acknowledged and will therefore not be 
further discussed. 
Chapter 6 will focus on the technical sides of DPRK’s nuclear weapons program because its 
technical capabilities have great impact on DPRK’s ability to use nuclear weapons. The North 
Korean will to use nuclear weapons is discussed in to two chapters; Chapter 7 focuses on 
DPRK’s will to use nuclear weapons against the United States. It does so by looking at North 
Korean rhetoric and threats directed at the United States, which American vital interests the 
DPRK are threatening and to which degree these vital interests are threatened. What one 
defines a vital interest is a complicated issue; some interests may be vital to one state, while 
others may perceive the same interests as less vital. Vital is in this thesis defined as an interest 
that is essential and absolutely necessary to the United Sates and the Republic of Korea. The 
chapter also discusses the American responses to DPRK’s nuclear threats and behavior. The 
chapter does so in order to highlight to what degree the United States perceive DPRK’s 
threats as credible.  Chapter 8 is built up the same way as Chapter 7 except that the focus is on 
the Republic of Korea instead of the United States.  
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5.2 Why the DPRK is refusing to give up its nuclear 
weapons  
There seems to be a universal agreement that using nuclear weapons in a wartime situation 
would be wildly inappropriate (Reif, 2013). The fact that nuclear weapons only have been 
used twice in a wartime situation supports this agreement. When the United States dropped 
the first atomic bomb no one really knew what effect the weapon would have. Now all 
countries have the knowledge, and today’s nuclear weapons are much more sophisticated than 
those used in 1945. China and India have pledged to a no first use policy which means that 
they will not use nuclear weapons unless they are first attacked by an adversary using such 
weapons. Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and France have pledged 
only to use nuclear weapons defensively which means that they will use nuclear weapons 
against states only if their territory or allied states are invaded or attacked. Israel has neither 
denied nor admitted to having nuclear weapons which also means that the country has not 
publically expressed a nuclear policy (Gerson, 2010; Ullman, 1972). Identifying patterns in 
DPRK’s behavior is difficult because the country has not publically expressed a nuclear 
policy along the lines of the other states.  
To understand DPRK’s nuclear policy it is important to look at why the DPRK decided to 
acquire nuclear weapons and why the leadership in the DPRK has chosen to keep its nuclear 
weapons. Reliable information about the internal dynamics of North Korean decision-making 
is limited. This combined with the fact that the North Korean leadership has strong incentives 
to cover its true intentions in order to maximize its bargaining power and to minimize 
international reactions to its nuclear weapons program, makes questions about DPRKs nuclear 
weapons intentions hard to answer (Saunders, 2003). Did the leadership in Pyongyang decide 
that nuclear weapons are essential to regime survival, making a negotiated deal impossible? 
Or is the nuclear weapons program a bargaining chip that the DPRK is prepared to trade away 
for the right price? (Saunders, 2003). These are difficult questions to answer.  
One of the main reasons for the DPRK maintaining its nuclear weapons program is, according 
to several analysts, security concerns. North Korean leaders seem to feel threatened by 
superior American military capabilities and by American talk about regime change and pre-
emptive strikes. North Korean leaders may have determined that nuclear weapons are the only 
way to guarantee regime survival (Saunders, 2003). Wanting regime change and enforcing 
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regime change is two very different aspects.  The United States has not showed intentions of 
invading the DPRK, and scholars have also come to this conclusion in various analysis 
(Acton, 2014 [phone interview]; Bumiller, 2002; Hunt, 2006) even though a main goal of the 
American government is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to force the North 
Korean regime to comply with international treaties such as the NPT.  
Even though the international community has little belief in the fact that the United States will 
invade the DPRK, the North Korean fear of an American invasion and a following regime 
change can be seen in relation to other states being invaded. Especially those states that once 
possessed weapons of mass destruction, but abolished them. One example is the American 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003; another is the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 
2011. The North Korean regime has several times made it clear that it believes that Muammar 
Gaddafi was executed because he gave up his nuclear weapons. Peter Hughes (former British 
Ambassador to the DPRK) said in 2011 that the regime in Pyongyang believes that NATO 
would never have waged an air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces if the Libyan 
dictator had not given up its weapons (NTI, 2011). Saddam Hussein was also forced to give 
up his weapons of mass destruction and he as well was killed while Iraq was invaded and 
regime change took place (Baer, 2013). This could mean that the Kim dynasty believes that if 
they were to give up its nuclear weapons then the DPRK would get invaded and that Kim 
Jong-un would be killed because that is what happened to Saddam Hussein and Muammar 
Gaddafi.  
Another scenario often discussed among scholars is the possibility that the DPRK are willing 
to negotiate its nuclear and missile program for a deal guaranteeing North Korean security 
and sovereignty. This is a scenario that argues that the North Korean leadership feels 
threatened by superior American capabilities and by American efforts to sanction and isolate 
the regime both economically and politically. According to such a scenario, the DPRK has 
developed a nuclear weapons program in order to create the necessary leverage to build a new 
relationship with the United States. Such a possible new relationship could ensure the 
regime’s survival and create a better environment for economic reforms in the DPRK 
(Saunders, 2003). Evidence in contradiction of such a scenario includes North Korean 
statements saying that the North Koreans will not under any circumstances give up its nuclear 
weapons (Reuters, 2013). North Korean nuclear actions and rhetoric also back up the point 
that such a scenario is unlikely. In sum, security reasons may explain why the DPRK are 
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refusing to give up its nuclear weapons. This thesis is based on that premise and specifically 
the fact that regime survival is the main reasons for North Korean refusal to abandon its 
nuclear weapons program.  
5.3 The Rationality of the Kim Regime 
Kim Jong-un’s rationality is a topic that is discussed by scholars (see (Roy, 1994; Smith, 
2000)). This topic is of great importance because DPRK’s willingness to use nuclear weapons 
is dependent on whether or not the regime is rational, because a unitary rational actor is 
guided by its own national interest and the ultimate national interest of every state is survival 
(see Section 3.4.1). If Kim Jong-un is rational, he will do everything in his power to protect 
his regime, and using nuclear weapons would put his regime at risk. There is disagreement in 
opinion regarding Kim-Jong un’s rationality, but most scholars view the regime in Pyongyang 
as a rational one13. Acton is one of the scholars who perceive him as a rational actor:  
I do not personally worry about Kim Jong-un waking up one morning and launching a 
nuclear weapon. I believe the North Korean regime is rational, not in the sense that it 
values the same things as we value, but in the sense that it does have priorities and it 
acts towards what protects those priorities, and the survival of the regime is the 
priority. I don’t think the regime is going to do anything to risk that. It is not going to 
attack the United States or people in the region with nuclear weapons unprovoked 
(Acton, 2014 [phone interview]).  
According to theory presented in Section 3.4.1, states or persons classified as risk-takers are 
the largest group to worry about because members of this category play at the edge of 
rationality. To carry out an attack involves calculating risks, and these can become 
miscalculations. The possibility of miscalculations can never be excluded even though 
supporters of nuclear deterrence theories argue that the possibilities of nuclear miscalculations 
are minimal (Geller, 1990). The three different Kim regimes in the DPRK have always been 
hostile towards the United States and its administrations. This hostile relationship is mostly 
due to the two countries’ troubled past with each other (see Chapter 2). This holds the basis 
for the present relationship between the two, but today a lot of the threats and rhetoric coming 
                                                 
13 13 See “Is the Kim Family Regime Rational and Why Don't the North Korean People Rebel?” by David S. 
Maxwell or "Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power" by Daniel Byman (Byman & Lind, 
2010; Maxwell, 2012) 
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from Pyongyang is due to misperceptions and uncertainties in relation to how the two 
countries act toward each other and what one country believes to be the other’s intention. 
Miscalculations and misperception therefore play a big role in the relationships the DPRK has 
with the United States in particular, but also with the ROK (Acton, 2014 [phone interview]). 
The main purpose of this thesis is not to define the DPRK and its leader’s rationality. 
However this aspect is tightly tied together with North Korean will to use nuclear weapons. 
Being a rational actor means that one is not willing to recklessly use nuclear weapons. 
Rationality according to western standards might as one can see above be perceived 
somewhat different than North Korean rationality, but the written and oral sources used in this 
thesis defines the Kim regime as a rational one according to definitions presented in Chapter 3 
because the survival of the regime is the main goal and acting irrational would jeopardize that. 
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6 DPRK’s Ability to Use Nuclear 
Weapons  
To build nuclear weapons is extremely comprehensive, expensive and technically demanding. 
The work employs at least several hundred scientists and engineers for years on top of 
requiring million dollars investments (Toft, 2004, p. 83). A nuclear weapons program 
involves a lot more than just the possession of a few weapons. 
It is a process of several steps, and the following main features needs to be included if one 
wishes to make one or more nuclear weapons: 
1. Producing fissile material 
2. Designing and building a nuclear charge (a nuclear device)  
3. Developing means of delivery for the nuclear weapons.  
4. Weaponization of the nuclear test device that is, making it sufficiently small, robust 
and reliable to be used with the chosen means of delivery.  
The DPRK has demonstrated its ability to carry out step 1-2, but that does not mean it 
possesses the ability to develop step 3-4. This section is organized in accordance to the four 
steps and ends with a conclusion summarizing DPRK’s overall ability to use nuclear 
weapons.  
6.1.1 Making Fissile Material 
Producing fissile material14 is the first and most difficult step in making nuclear weapons. 
Two different paths can be taken; the plutonium and the uranium path. The most common 
fissile materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239. One needs either a uranium enrichment 
                                                 
14 Fission is a decomposition of a heavy nucleus. Energy and typically two or three free neutrons are released 
during fission. A chain reaction occurs when the neutrons that are released in the fission, induce at least one new 
fission; this maintains the process. Material that can sustain a chain reaction is called fissile material. All nuclear 
charges require fissile material. A critical mass is the minimum amount of a given fissile material required to 
sustain such a chain reaction. A nuclear explosion needs a minimum of one critical mass. (Toft, 2004, pp. 85–
87). 
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plant for the acquisition of uranium-235 or a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant for the 
acquisition of plutonium-239 (Toft, 2004, pp. 85–87). The DPRK is known for reprocessing 
plutonium, but speculations have arisen whether or not the DPRK is also producing weapons 
grade uranium. The United States officially confronted the DPRK with evidence suggesting 
that the DPRK was pursuing a highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program in 2002. Dr. 
Siegfried Hecker15 visited DPRK’s enrichment plant it in April 2009 and was surprised both 
by the size and advanced state of technology at the uranium enrichment facility. The United 
States did not know of the facility’s existence until Dr. Hecker visited it in April 2009 
(Roehrig, 2013, p. 1). The Pyongyang leadership confirmed this speculations regarding HEU 
when they informed the UN Security Council in 2009 that it was ready to enter the final phase 
of uranium enrichment, but the extent of DPRK’s HEU program has never been made public 
(Roehrig, 2013, p. 1). It is virtually impossible to verify whether or not a state is enriching 
weapons grade uranium because most technology inside enrichment plants are kept secret, 
and the DPRK has not gained the IAEA access to its enrichment plants (Centre for Arms 
Control, 2013; Høibråten et al., 2013, p. 47; Toft, 2004, p. 85). If the plant in the DPRK 
actually was in full operation in November 2010, which is what is being claimed, then it is 
inconceivable that it is the first enrichment plant in the DPRK (Høibråten et al., 2013, p. 47). 
The DPRK is believed to have a plutonium stockpile of between 50 kg and 70 kg with a 
portion of this being used in its three nuclear tests, but the exact stockpile is unknown. This 
means that the DPRK only has a small amount of plutonium, and it could be difficult for them 
to produce more because, but it is important to keep in mind that a lot of this information is 
speculative.  
The reason why the DPRK wishes to enrich uranium is because it would allow the country to 
increase its arsenal relatively quickly (Acton, 2013; Centre for Arms Control, 2013; Høibråten 
et al., 2013, p. 40), but the reason why the DPRK has continued with the reprocessing of 
plutonium along with an alleged HEU program is a bit strange because when one first has an 
enrichment plant, it is easier and less expensive to continue using that than going back to the 
plutonium path. Analysts believe the DPRK have chosen to do both, and there are several 
                                                 
15 Siegfried Hecker is an American nuclear scientist who worked as the Director of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory from 1986 till 1997. Today he is a professor (research) in the Department of Management Science 
and Engineering and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Dr. Hecker’s 
research projects at CISAC focus on reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism worldwide and the challenges of 
nuclear India, the DPRK, Pakistan, and the nuclear aspirations of Iran. Dr. Hecker has since 2004 visited the 
DPRK once a year in an unofficial capacity to assess the plutonium program at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific 
Research Center. In 2010 did North Korean officials revealed a modern uranium enrichment facility with close 
to 2,000 centrifuges to Dr. Hecker (CISAC, 2014; Roehrig, 2013) 
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possible explanations to why. The first reason may be that the DPRK just wants to produce as 
much fissile material as possible without taking into account the economic obstacles. The 
second possible explanation is that plutonium has some advantages when it comes to building 
miniaturized warheads, and maybe the DPRK wants plutonium for that cause. The third 
possible option is that DPRK’s uranium enrichment process is not working properly. There is 
no proof that the DPRK is actually capable of producing HEU. It is probable that it is, but no 
such proof exists (Acton, 2014 [phone interview]; Davenport, 2013b). Regardless of DPRK’s 
ability to enrich weapons grade uranium, the regime in Pyongyang has a plutonium stockpile 
demonstrating their ability to carry out the most difficult step in making nuclear weapons.  
6.1.2 Nuclear Weapon Design  
There are two types of nuclear charges; fission charges and thermonuclear charges. 
Furthermore, there are also two kinds of fission charges: gun-barrel design and implosion 
design. Gun-barrel designs are rarely used by states possessing nuclear weapons today. 
Implosion design is believed to be the design used by the North Koreans and is preferred by 
states possessing nuclear weapons because;  
1. It enables the use of plutonium 
2. The blast force is greater if the operation is successful 
3. The charge can be made lighter because plutonium has a lower critical mass than 
uranium (Toft, 2004, pp. 89–90).  
DPRK’s nuclear weapon designs are not known, but its three nuclear tests have given analysts 
some indications. Two main indicators are important after a nuclear test: the yield of the 
device and the type of fissile material used. Combined these two can reveal much about 
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program (Nikitin, 2013, p. 13). DPRK’s first nuclear test took place 
on 9 October 2006. Media has reported that the North Korean leader informed China 20 
minutes before the test was executed that his country planned to test a charge of 4 kilotons. 
The test only had a yield of about 1 kiloton, and was the world’s weakest first nuclear test. 
The North Koreans claimed the test was successful, while the international society viewed it 
as a flop (Centre for Arms Control, 2013; Høibråten et al., 2013, pp. 41–42). The second test 
took place on 25 May 2009. Official and unofficial reports vary on estimated yield of the 
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explosion, but it is generally regarded as being 2-3 kilotons, and again deemed unsuccessful 
by the international community and successful by the North Koreans themselves (ibid).  
The third test took place on 12 February 2013. The South Korean Ministry of Defense 
estimated that the third test was between 6 and 7 kilotons (Centre for Arms Control, 2013; 
Nikitin, 2013, p. 14). The DPRK claimed that the third test was to develop “a smaller and 
light” warhead. The North Koreans have also claimed this test to be successful, and this time 
the international community agrees. Both test number one and test number two most likely 
involved plutonium, but there have been speculations as to whether or not the third test 
involved uranium (ibid).  These speculations are due to DPRK’s revealing of its modern 
uranium enrichment facility to Dr. Siegfried Hecker in 2010, but have not been confirmed.  
As shown throughout this thesis, DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is surrounded by secrecy. 
It is impossible to know the exact design of their nuclear weapons, but the three tests prove 
that the DPRK has in fact successfully developed nuclear charges. The third test also shows 
that their nuclear weapons have evolved and have been improved, since this test has been 
judged as successful by several sources. Some researchers believe that the second test was an 
attempt to improve the weapon tested in 2006. The possibility that a new weapon was tested 
in 2013, may indicate that the improvements the leadership in Pyongyang wanted to make had 
led to a successful design.  
6.1.3 Means of Delivery  
A delivery system is the means by which nuclear weapons hit their intended targets. A 
delivery system can be an aircraft carrying nuclear bombs or missiles with nuclear 
warheads16. A missile can be launched from land, ships or submarines. In this section, most 
attention will be given to missiles, as ballistic missiles are the most appropriate means of 
delivery for North Korean nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles are classified according to the 
maximum distance they can travel. The maximum range is determined by the missile’s 
                                                 
16 Other means of delivery can also be used, but these two are the most relevant ones and therefore the only two 
included here.  
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weight, the weight of the fuel and the engine (Arms Control Association, 2012). Four general 
classes17 of ballistic missiles are commonly referred to:  
• Short-range ballistic missiles (travels less than 1,000 kilometers)18 
• Medium-range ballistic missiles (travels between 1,000–3,000 kilometers) 
• Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (travels between 3,000–5,500 kilometers) 
• Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (travels more than 5,500 kilometers) (Arms 
Control Association, 2012).  
It is estimated that the DPRK has over 200 medium-range Nodong ballistic missiles. Figure 
2.1 in Chapter 2 shows DPRK’s ballistic missiles maximum range according to open sources 
and estimates. The DPRK is not able to reliably hit the continental United States19 with a 
nuclear missile due to the fact that the DPRK’s most advanced operational missile is a 
Nodong missile (see Table 6.1). A Nodong missile has an estimated maximum range of 1,300 
km. It is important to keep in mind when discussing these topics that the ranges given in 
Table 6.1 are estimates based on open sources. It is impossible to exactly estimate a missile’s 
maximum range because it depends on the missile’s payload, and this information is not 
publically known (Arms Control Association, 2012). 
Table 6.1 DPRK’s Estimated Ballistic Missile Inventory 
System Status Range 
Nodong-120 Operational 900-1,500 km 
Taepodong-1 Tested (unsuccessfully) 1,500 - 2,500 km 
Taepodong-2 (2-stage) Tested/Development 4,000-15,000 km21 
Taepodong-222 (3-stage) Tested/Development Up to 15,000 km 
Musudan/BM-25/SS-N-6 
variant 
Development?  Up to 3,200 km  
(Arms Control Association, 2012; Høibråten et al., 2013, pp. 48–54) 
                                                 
17 Missiles are often classified also by their fuel-type. Two sorts of fuel-types exist: liquid or solid propellants. 
Ballistic missiles with solid fuel require less maintenance and preparation time than missiles with liquid fuel 
(Arms Control Association 2012) 
18 Short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles are also called theater ballistic missiles while ICBMs and 
long-range ballistic missiles are referred to as strategic ballistic missiles (Arms Control Association 2012).  
19 Other United States interests in the region that DPRK most likely can hit will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
20 Nodong and related missiles are believed to be developed by the DPRK with foreign assistance from the late 
1980s until the early 1990s. The missile went through a failed test in 1992 and a relatively successful test in 
1993 (Høibråten et al., 2013, p. 48).  
21 Different sources estimate different ranges for Taepodong-2. One source estimates 10,000-15,000 km while 
another estimates 4,000-8,000 km (Høibråten et al., 2013, pp. 51–52). Due to the highly uncertain number, the 
whole possible range is reflected in table 6.1. 
22 A Taepodong-2 took off from a launch site in western DPRK in April 2012 but failed 90 seconds into its flight 
and fell into the Yellow Sea (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013, p. 7).  
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Table 6.1 lists the different types of missiles. Along with the missiles mentioned here, the 
DPRK has over 600 missiles called Scud-B or Scud-C that are both operational with a range 
of 300 km to 700 km (Arms Control Association, 2012). These missiles are generally not 
considered particularly well suited to deliver nuclear weapons, although the USSR had some 
Scud missiles with a nuclear mission during the Cold War. Nodong is the first relevant missile 
for nuclear weapons delivery in the DPRK (Høibråten et al., 2013, p. 48). The Taepodong-1 
missile is by many viewed as a development step towards launchers for a space program and 
ICBMs such as Taepodong-2/Unha-2. Taepodong-1 missiles are operationally very 
vulnerable due to a long preparation time before launch. The Musudan missile has not been 
flight tested, but has been paraded on land mobile ramps in Pyongyang. If the DPRK gets 
these missiles operational, they will be highly relevant for nuclear weapons, and the range can 
be as long as 3,200 km depending on the load (Høibråten et al., 2013, pp. 48–49). There is a 
genuine concern in the United States intelligence community about these road mobile 
missiles. Their capability has never been tested, and the international community is of the 
opinion that testing is a while away (NTI, 2013b, 2013d; Oswald, 2013). It is made clear that 
there are god reasons to be worried about these missiles. This is partly because the world has 
no idea where the DPRK is in terms of its warhead program. The DPRK will be able to build 
a miniaturized warhead program, but the timeframe is unknown (ibid).   
There are great uncertainties relating to the capacity and development of the North Korean 
ballistic missiles. One cannot know for sure if the DPRK has the capacity to hit their intended 
targets when they threaten with a nuclear weapons strike, but in order for the DPRK to hit the 
continental United States it will need an ICBM. According to the Arms Control Association, 
the DPRK developed and has tested such a ballistic missile in the form of Taepodong-2, but it 
is not yet operational. That means the DPRK is not reliably able to hit the continental United 
States with a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear weapon. The Republic of Korea on the other 
hand shares a border with the DPRK, and Nodong missiles can reach all of the Korean 
Peninsula. Seoul is only 194 km away from Pyongyang. According to available figures and 
estimates, the North Koreans have the ability to attack the Republic of Korea with nuclear 
weapons as they have threatened to do. On the other hand, at present the continental United 
States is, according to public sources, not vulnerable to a North Korean nuclear weapons 
attack.  
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6.1.4 Weaponization 
Weaponization constitutes manufacturing and maintaining a set of activities and facilities that 
can produce and maintain functioning nuclear weapons. This means that step 1-3 must have 
taken place, and that the weapons produced work as intended along with suitable delivery 
means. It is known that the DPRK has produced fissile material and used it in a nuclear 
weapons design as one can see from the previous sections. The regime also has operational 
Nodong missiles that can reliably hit within the range of Figure 2.1. But full nuclear 
weaponization requires more than a few nuclear charges and a few ballistic missiles with a 
relative short range. Nuclear weaponization implies a fully operational nuclear weapons 
program, and there are uncertainties related to whether or not the DPRK has achieved that. 
The biggest uncertainty when it comes to DPRK’s weaponization is the size of its nuclear 
weapons. After DPRK’s third nuclear test in February 2013, the Korean Central News 
Agency (KCNA) issued a statement saying that the DPRK had tested a “miniaturized and 
lighter device with greater explosive force than previously” (Sanger & Sang-hun, 2013b). 
This sparked concern over whether or not the regime in Pyongyang had actually mastered the 
technology to make miniaturized warheads that are small enough to be mounted on ballistic 
missiles.   
David Albright, the President of the Institute for Science and International Security, wrote in 
February 2013 that “North Korea likely has the capability to mount a plutonium-based 
nuclear warhead on the shorter range Nodong missile”. Albright stated in the same article that 
it was unlikely that Pyongyang had developed this capability for ICBMs (Albright, 2013). 
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) expressed “moderate confidence” in April 2013 that 
the DPRK had developed the ability to place a miniaturized nuclear weapon on a ballistic 
missile (NTI, 2013c). This moderate confidence has been disputed by other intelligence 
agencies as well as by the South Korean government and President Obama (Chicago Tribune 
Times, 2013; Sanger, 17, & 2013, 2013). It is very important to keep in mind that the DIA in 
their report made it clear that “reliability will be low” for any hypothetical North Korean 
nuclear missile (NTI, 2013c).These divergent analyses and opinions about DPRK’s ability to 
place a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile result in questions about the actual 
weaponization. In order to fulfill requirements for weaponization, the DPRK needs to have 
built functional nuclear weapons, have developed missiles that can reliably hit its intended 
50 
 
target and possess nuclear charges small enough to fit on the missiles. What are DPRK’s 
Nuclear Weapons Abilities? 
Having the ability to use nuclear weapons involves the four steps presented in the sections 
above, but ability is not a yes or no answer; there are degrees to having the ability to use 
nuclear weapons. Due to the secrecy surrounding these weapons, it is impossible to get a full 
and exact overview of DPRK’s ability to use nuclear weapons, but as shown from the text 
above a lot of information is known.  
It is known that the DPRK have produced fissile material, because it would be impossible to 
test its nuclear explosive devices without it. Even though there are uncertainties surrounding 
the North Koreans’ ability to produce HEU, one knows from its three nuclear tests that the 
DPRK have at least produced a certain amount of plutonium. The three nuclear tests can 
indicate that the North Koreans have been successful in assembling an implosion nuclear 
weapon design, but this is not proven.  These two steps have been known to the international 
community since the first test took place on 9 October 2006. The uncertainties surrounding 
DPRK’s ability to use nuclear weapons are related to step 3, means of delivery for nuclear 
weapons, and 4, weaponization.  
At present the DPRK do not have a reliable capability to hit targets in the continental United 
States with a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear weapon. According to deterrence theory, that 
makes Pyongyang’s deterrence effect less effective because the threat is not credible. As 
shown by Table 6.1 a threat directed at a target in the continental United States is weakened. 
According to sources outside the DPRK, the DPRK do not yet have operational ICBMs, 
which means that the North Koreans cannot follow through with its threats towards the 
continental United States today. Deterrence is therefore not at its fullest when it is directed at 
the continental United States. However, it is important to keep in mind that it is unknown how 
long it will take the North Koreans to develop a reliable capability. What North Korea 
considers to be a reliable capability might not be identical to what the United States considers 
to be a reliable capability. If a North Korean missile has a 50% chance of hitting the United 
States that might be satisfactory for its purposes while the United States might demand 98% 
reliability, for example. The missile program in the DPRK is present and it will be able to 
reach the continental United States in the future if the regime continues to spend substantial 
amounts of money on the program and testing the missiles.  James M. Acton does not want to 
overestimate the immediacy of the ICBM threat from the North Koreans, but he do believe it 
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is emerging (Acton, 2014 [phone interview]; NTI, 2013d). However, it is hard to predict any 
time frame. Another important fact to keep in mind is that there is a genuine concern in the 
United States intelligence environment about DPRK’s road mobile missiles. This capability 
has never been tested, and it is not expected to be seen in the near future.  
The United States also have further interests in close proximity to the DPRK beyond what has 
been discussed in this section. This topic will be further introduced and discussed in Chapters 
7 and 8. The ROK is at a higher risk than the United States because most of DPRK’s ballistic 
missiles can reach the entire Korean peninsula, and steps 1-3 is therefore applicable for 
DPRK’s nuclear threats directed at the ROK.  
Step 4, weaponization, is the most complex of all the four steps. It can be derived from step 1-
3 that the DPRK in some sense has accomplished partial weaponization, but questions related 
to the size and range of North Korean nuclear weapons are much more difficult to answers. 
The DPRK is regarded as one of the last countries closed to external insight, pressure and 
influence which means that it is difficult to know the extent of DPRK’s progress regarding its 
nuclear weapons program. All views presented in this thesis that are not collected from North 
Korean state sources are educated guesses made by scholars and researchers which makes it 
impossible to firmly determine whether or not the DPRK has accomplished full 
weaponization of its nuclear charges. It is difficult to give a complete answer to whether or 
not the DPRK has the ability to produce, maintain and develop a nuclear weapons program. 
But as one can see from this text, in terms of DPRK’s nuclear abilities, the Republic of Korea 
is more at risk than the continental United States for a nuclear weapons attack from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  
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7 DPRK’s Will to Use Nuclear 
Weapons against the United States 
The DPRK has made clear that it is “opposed to any act of forcing American-style democracy 
on the DPRK” and that “the DPRK's nuclear deterrence is neither a means of dealing nor a 
bargaining chip to be used for improving the inter-Korean relations” (KCNA, 2014).  The 
threats, statements and information that have come out from Pyongyang have made it clear 
that the DPRK is not willing to give up its nuclear weapons. The regime in Pyongyang has 
since the Obama Administration took office in 2009 demanded to be recognized as a NWS. 
The DPRK has also made clear that a peace treaty with the United States must be an incentive 
to denuclearization. The last demand is according to North Korean officials a way of building 
trust between the two states (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013, p. 6). These two demands are 
contradictory. The last demand is not a direct way to build trust, but it reflects a wish to do so.  
The wish to build trust is most likely propaganda, because looking at the threats directed at 
the United States through YouTube videos and statements through the KCNA (which will be 
introduced later in this chapter), it seems like building trust is not the North Korean goal. The 
premise of negotiations between the United States and the DPRK has always been that the 
North Koreans are going to give up its nuclear weapons, but the North Koreans have made it 
clear that this will not happen (Reuters, 2013). Whether or not more agreements between the 
two countries will take place in the future is hard to predict, but it is unlikely at this moment 
when looking at North Korean rhetoric and threats directed at the United States. The North 
Korean news agency KCNA often portrays news articles with threats directed at either the 
United States or the Republic of Korea: 
The hostile forces should not misjudge the will of the army and people of the DPRK to 
annihilate enemies. We will lose only the Military Demarcation Line and the wall of 
division from the sacred war of justice and gain national reunification, the lasting 
peace on the Korean Peninsula and the eternal prosperity of the nation (KCNA, 
2013b).  
The question being discussed in the present chapter is whether or not there is any accuracy to 
the North Korean threats directed at the United States. This is a complicated question with 
complicated answers. It is important to keep in mind that one does not know the exact answer, 
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but one can make analyses based on the information available. According to James M. Acton 
(2014 [phone interview]) there are circumstances where one could imagine the North Koreans 
using nuclear weapons, but it is important to keep in mind that the regime in Pyongyang is not 
under any illusions, they know that if they were to use nuclear weapons they would be in 
misfortune with the international community. The DPRK might use nuclear weapons in a 
scenario where a conflict escalates on the Korean peninsula. In such a scenario where the 
United States gets involved, the DPRK might view the consequences of not using nuclear 
weapons as worse than using nuclear weapons. The specific circumstance that this could 
happen is in the event that the DPRK believes rightly or wrongly that the United States is 
trying to accomplish regime change. The North Koreans might in such a situation believe that 
if it uses nuclear weapons it might scare the United States off (Acton, 2014 [phone 
interview]). At the same time, the DPRK is well aware that the United States possesses a large 
arsenal of nuclear weapons. It is also important to recognize the role misperception can play 
in such a scenario. The United States might not want regime change, but the North Koreans 
believe they do. A concern is that Kim Jong-un is very young and generally inexperienced 
with foreign affairs, which can create additional risks (Frank, 2011).  
7.1 DPRK’s Nuclear Threats Directed at the United 
States 
None of the other seven or eight states possessing nuclear weapons has threatened other states 
with nuclear weapons strikes like the DPRK has done on numerous occasions against both the 
United States and the ROK (NTI 2014):  
Should the U.S. ignite a war in the end, it will cause flames of justice to flare up like 
an erupting volcano in which the aggressors will perish and the cursed Military 
Demarcation Line disappear for good (KCNA, 2013a) 
The threats coming from Pyongyang through the KCNA is unlike any other state rhetoric. It is 
important to keep in mind that the KCNA represents the government’s views and that it is a 
state news agency and propaganda tool. It is also important to understand the severity behind 
North Korean rhetoric and the fact that quotations presented here are not the only ones. 
KCNA news reports show the deep hatred the North Korean government has towards the 
United States:  
54 
 
He [President Obama] acts just like a monkey with a red bum irrationally eating 
everything – not only from the floor but also from trees here and there…Africa’s 
national zoo will be the perfect place for Obama to live with licking bread crumbs 
thrown by visitors (NK News, 2014)23 
This specific news report does not represent a nuclear threat directed at the United States, but 
it does show the language that the North Korean government officials use. One does not find 
any other governments officials using similar language directed at other Presidents. This 
chapter is trying to show that the rhetoric and threats from the DPRK are completely different 
from any other state, being so explicit and outrageous. Just a year prior to this statement a 
spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry stated that:  
First, now that the U.S. is set to light a fuse for a nuclear war, the revolutionary 
armed forces of the DPRK will exercise the right to a preemptive nuclear attack to 
destroy the strongholds of the aggressors and to defend the supreme interests of the 
country (KCNA, 2013a) 
This represents a clear nuclear threat directed at the United States. Whether these threats 
represent a warning or just propaganda trying to deter the United States is impossible to 
know, but written threats in the form of KCNA news are not the only ones coming out from 
Pyongyang. Among the many threats, Uriminzokkiri24 posted a four-minute long video on 
their YouTube channel titled "Firestorms will rain on the Headquarters of War". The first two 
minutes of the video shows still photos of United States fighter jets, B-52 bombers and 
aircraft carriers. These images are intended to portray the United States as a nuclear power 
trying to bully the DPRK into doing what it wants. The narrator of the video warns that 
"Second by second, the fuse of a nuclear war is burning" while also stating that "There is no 
limit to the range of our strategic rockets" while showing animated pictures of the United 
States Capitol building exploding in a fireball (The Telegraph, 2013).  
                                                 
23 NK News is not to be confused with KCNA. NK News is a website that provides news and analysis about the 
DPRK. The reporting is based on information collected from recently returned western visitors to the DPRK, 
stories filed by the KCNA, interviews with North Koreans living abroad, and reports published by NGOs and 
western governments. 
24Uriminzokkiri is a North Korean official website that distributes news and propaganda from the state media in 
Korean.  Uriminzokkiri’s server is located in China and the news distributor also has YouTube, Facebook, and 
Twitter accounts.  
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This propaganda video is just one of many threats directed at the United States, but as stated 
several times throughout this thesis, the DPRK does not have the reliable capability to reach 
the United States with nuclear weapons. Several researchers agree with this and one of them 
is Sverre Lodgaard. He has stated that  
The DPRK does not at this point threaten the continental United States, but it may be 
about to pose a threat to American interests in the region around the Korean 
Peninsula (Lodgaard 2014[interview]) 
If estimates presented of North Korean missiles are true, the DPRK will be able to hit Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and some United States bases in the pacific with nuclear weapons (see 
figure 2.1), but it is important to keep in mind that that the estimates presented in this thesis is 
just that, no exact information of North Korean nuclear capability is available. More testing 
and development of nuclear weapon designs and ballistic missiles remains, and it is very 
unclear whether the DPRK presently has the capacity to mount a nuclear weapon onto a 
ballistic missile (see Section 6.1.4). Whether the North Korean capacity is reliable or not, the 
United States has security commitments to several countries in Northeast Asia that are within 
the range of Nodong missiles, and these commitments have been the recipient of North 
Korean threats:  
The artillery units of the Korean People's Army, including the rocket units, have been 
on standby, zeroing on the targets in the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, Guam and South 
Korea (KCNA, 2013d).  
The American commitments abroad include Japan under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. The treaty commits the parties 
to “act to meet the common danger” from an “armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan” (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
between Japan and the United States of America, 1960). This means that the United States is 
obliged to defend Japan if the country was attacked. That is why the United States has a huge 
number of military and civilian personnel stationed in Japan. The American military strength 
in Japan consists today of approximately 38,000 military personnel, 43,000 dependents, 5,000 
Department of Defense civilian employees, and 25,000 Japanese workers (U.S./Japan 
Alliance, 2014). These numbers add up to over 100,000 people (including the Japanese 
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workers) and the 100,000 people and military equipment constitute a vital interest for the 
United States in Japan, which also lies within the range of North Korean Nodong missiles.  
After stating that the United States has vital interests in Japan, it is important to look at 
whether or not these interests are threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. The DPRK 
has a very hostile relationship with the United States as previously stated, but the regime in 
Pyongyang also has a very strained and hostile relationship with Japan. The tension between 
the two states goes back to before the Korean War when the Japanese colonized the Korean 
Peninsula (Roy, 1988). The DPRK has explicitly threatened Japan with a nuclear weapons 
attack: 
The DPRK always remembers that Japan was an accomplice in the Korean War 
ignited by the U.S. Japan always remains a target of the DPRK's revolutionary armed 
forces. Once Japan makes even a slight provocation against the DPRK, the former 
will be hard hit before any others. Those who dream of getting a "shower of gold" on 
the Korean Peninsula are bound to perish in the nuclear disaster. Japan would be well 
advised to face up to the situation and behave itself (KCNA, 2013c).  
The regime in Pyongyang stated in 2013 that ”nuclear war is unavoidable” and that its first 
target will be Japan (KCNA, 2013c). It is unlikely that the DPRK would attack another 
country unprovoked due to the fact that it would most likely mean the end of the regime 
(Acton, 2014 [phone interview]; Diplomat, 2014 [interview]; Lodgaard, 2014 [interview]). 
The DPRK also knows that Japan is under the American nuclear umbrella, and that similarly 
to the ROK the United States is obliged to defend Japan in case of a possible attack. It would 
be very risky for the DPRK to challenge retaliation from the United States. It is harder to 
assess whether or not the DPRK would retaliate with nuclear weapons if it was the country 
being attacked first. Even though many analysts see North Korean nuclear weapons as purely 
defensive (ibid), it does seem like Japan is taking the threat from the DPRK seriously, 
because the Japanese government vowed to strike any North Korean missiles it deemed a 
threat after the DPRK launched a medium-range ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan in early 
2014 (Frizell, 2014). This North Korean action prompted retaliation by the South Koreans 
that also took place in the Sea of Japan. The regime in Pyongyang fired two missiles on 26 
March 2014 which was apparently to show defiance just as the United States, the ROK and 
Japan began discussions on how to contain North Korea’s nuclear threats (Frizell, 2014). 
After this incident, the United States again vowed to protect Japan when Secretary of defense 
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Chuck Hagel stated that the United States was standing firmly by its mutual defense 
agreement with its ally. He also stated that there is no “weakness on the part of the United 
States as to our complete and absolute commitment to the security of Japan” (Frizell, 2014). 
Japan is not the only target the DPRK has threatened outside of the continental United States. 
As quoted from the KCNA news report, presented at the top of this section, the regime in 
Pyongyang has threatened Guam, which is an American territory in the western Pacific 
Ocean. This territory has had strategic significance to the United States forward deployment 
for a long time. The island has two important American military bases and approximately 
160,000 people live on Guam including 6,000 military personnel (Kan, 2013, p. 1). The 
United States began in the year 2000 to build up air and naval forces in order to boost 
American deterrence and power projection in Asia (Kan, 2013). After the regime in 
Pyongyang threatened to attack Guam, the United States said that it would send a missile 
defense system to Guam to defend it from the DPRK as the American military adjusted to 
what United States Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called a "real and clear danger" from 
the DPRK (J. Kim & Stewart, 2013). The fact that the United States Secretary of Defense 
called this threat a real and clear danger is interesting and it is not possible to know what the 
American government means by this statement. It is often difficult to assess whether a 
statement is pure honesty or a calculated response.  
It is important to look at the dates of the threats coming from the regime in Pyongyang. The 
threats towards Guam came in April 2013, just after the UNSC had imposed sanctions on the 
DPRK after its third nuclear weapons test in February 2013. The White House stated just after 
the threats had been expressed that there was no sign of North Korean preparation of its 1.2 
million soldiers for war (J. Kim & Stewart, 2013). The lack of military preparation could 
indicate that the threats are a part of domestic politics to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s position. 
Strengthening of a position is important in the DPRK, and the celebration of the anniversary 
of Kim Il-sung’s birthday on 15 April (Rauhala, 2014) took place just after the North Korean 
regime directed new nuclear threats at the United States. This is of course not possible to 
prove, but this is a possible explanation looking at Pyongyang’s previous rhetoric and way of 
acting. The threats might have had domestic purposes, but the United States took them 
seriously and seemed to view them as real and dangerous even though Guam is not within the 
range of a Nodong missile. In order to hit Guam the DPRK needed a reliable Musudan missile 
(see figure 2.1).  The DPRK has paraded Musudan missiles, and after the threat against Guam 
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the regime in Pyongyang, according to several sources quoted by Yonhap25, moved what 
seemed to be a Musudan missile to the North Korean east coast (McCurry, 2013). The South 
Korean defense ministry declined to comment the speculations. The DPRK has a launch site 
on the northeastern coast that has been unsuccessfully used in the past to test long-range 
rockets (ibid). This shows that the United States has vital interests on Guam and that 
Pyongyang has threatened to attack the island. At the moment the DPRK does not have a 
reliable missile that can reach Guam, but the fact that the United States is taking the threats 
seriously could indicate that it is scared of possible future North Korean nuclear capabilities. 
This was made apparent already in 1998 when the commission assessing the ballistic missiles 
threats to the United States concluded that  
North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the 
United States itself, because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile 
capabilities it possesses--missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) and underground facility expertise--to other countries of missile 
proliferation concern. (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States, 1998) 
Along with Japan, the United States does have other vital interests within range of the North 
Korean Nodong missiles. DPRK’s neighbor on the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea, 
is host to approximately 25,000 American soldiers and around 150,000 American civilians 
(USFK, 2014). As stated earlier the ROK is under the United States nuclear umbrella, and the 
relationship between the two states runs deep. The United States and the Republic of Korea 
conduct annual ”Key Resolve” and ”Foal Eagle” drills (France-Presse, 2014). Key Resolve is 
an exercise that lasts just over a week and is mainly computer simulated; Foal Eagle on the 
other hand is an eight-week long military exercise that involves air, ground and naval field 
training. The military drills play out different scenarios to combat a possible North Korean 
invasion, but the Americans and South Koreans both insist that the two military drills are 
purely defensive (ibid). The two military exercises are annually condemned by the DPRK as 
rehearsals for invasion (France-Presse, 2014). After the third North Korean nuclear test in 
February 2013, the UNSC imposed new sanctions on the regime in Pyongyang. The annual 
                                                 
25 Yonhap is the largest South Korean News Agency. It is based in Seoul and provides news articles, pictures 
and other information to newspapers, TV networks and other media in the Republic of Korea. 
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military drill between the United States and the ROK started just a month after the test and 
involved over 13,000 American and South Korean troops (ibid).  
Key Resolve and Foal Eagle show not only the seriousness of the relationship between the 
United States and the Republic of Korea, but also the seriousness of the North Korean 
position and possible threat on the Korean Peninsula. These exercises might possibly just be 
defensive as the Americans are claiming. But even so if the Americans did not have any vital 
interest to protect, it is less likely that the military drills would be conducted on the scale that 
they are. Before the military drills took place in 2011, the DPRK threatened "all-out war" in 
response to the military exercises. The KCNA also warned that Seoul would be turned into a 
“sea of flames” (BBC, 2011). The DPRK has on several occasions directed threats at the 
United States and the ROK in connection with the military drills. There are no sources 
indicating that the United States and the ROK have cancelled their war games due to the 
increased level of tension and the threats directed at the two states from the DPRK. This fact 
can indicate that the United States and the ROK are not swayed by North Korean threats.  
The United States has several vital interests in the Republic of Korea. American military and 
civilian personnel are vital interests due to the large number of Americans in the ROK. Key 
Resolve and Foal Eagle indicate that the military and political relationship between the United 
States and the Republic of Korea is another vital interest. The ROK is very dependent on this 
cooperation in order to protect itself from a possible attack from the North (Diplomat, 2014 
[interview]) but the Americans might be almost just as dependent on this relationship due to 
the unique position it gives the United States on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 
7.2 American Reactions to North Korean Nuclear 
Threats 
Since the DPRK first threatened to leave the NPT the American reaction towards North 
Korean nuclear threats and behavior has ranged from bilateral engagement to calling the 
leadership in Pyongyang part of an “axis of evil” (President George W. Bush, 2002). The 
American concerns in the DPRK cover crucial security, political, and human rights26. The 
regime in the DPRK has repeatedly provoked the United States, but no publically available 
evidence shows that the American administrations have seriously considered a direct military 
                                                 
26 Only security issues related to nuclear weapons will be discussed in this thesis.  
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strike or an explicit policy of regime change due to the threat of devastating war on the 
peninsula since 1994 (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013, p. 3). American relations with the 
Republic of Korea influence United States behavior towards the DPRK because the bilateral 
military alliance between the two countries obligates the United States to defend the ROK 
from any possible attack from the DPRK. This part of the chapter will look at the United 
States reactions to North Korean nuclear provocations. Five nuclear incidents and American 
reactions will be discussed in detail: when the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 
1993, when the DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and DPRK’s three nuclear tests in 
2006, 2009 and 2013. These incidents have been chosen due to the severity of these actions 
and the availability of American reactions to the incidents. The five incidents discussed below 
will also be discussed in relation to South Korean reactions in Chapter 8.  The American 
reactions discussed in the chapter below could either be American actions (for example 
negotiations, sanctions etc.) or official American statements (rhetoric, threats etc.). North 
Korean nuclear incidents have not always triggered both actions and statements from the 
American administration, which is why both kinds of reactions are not covered in all sections 
below. It is important to look at statements along with actions because official American 
statements are thoroughly planned and might indicate if the United States is taking a North 
Korean threat seriously. 
7.2.1 The DPRK Threatens to Withdraw from the NPT – 
1993 
The North Korean regime announced its withdrawal from the NPT on 11 March 1993. The 
Clinton administration responded with saying that a withdrawal was unacceptable and that 
Pyongyang instead had to fully implement the Safeguard Agreements27 to the IAEA (Wit, 
Poneman, & Gallucci, 2004, pp. 26–28). The American government viewed DPRK’s 
withdrawal as a great security threat to the whole world along with weakening the NPT and 
its intention to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration’s reactions 
to the North Korean threat of withdrawal were to forge a strategy which focused on building a 
global coalition against DPRK’s move (ibid).  
                                                 
27 All non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT is obliged to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements 
with the IAEA, hereby allowing the agency to inspect declared nuclear facilities, radioactive sources or special 
fissionable material (IAEA 2005, 5).  
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Unofficial talks began between the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). The United States, Great Britain and France sought a UN condemnation of 
DPRK, but China blocked the efforts to secure such a statement in order not to provoke the 
regime in Pyongyang (Wit et al., 2004, p. 31). United States intelligence analysts warned the 
Clinton administration that the DPRK most likely would view sanctions as an act of war and 
therefore react violently. The Clinton administration therefore chose a milder path that meant 
they would seek to build a coalition and increase pressure on the regime in Pyongyang 
through gradual escalation. The American government also wished to get China on board 
eventually. This strategy was carried out when the UNSC on 8 April 1993 expressed concerns 
and welcomed all efforts to resolve the situation (Wit et al., 2004, pp. 32–34).  
Along with building a global coalition against the regime in Pyongyang, the Americans 
realized that a coercive diplomacy would require an integrated use of carrots and sticks. If 
they were not able to stop DPRK’s quest for nuclear weapons through negotiations, then the 
only real alternative left was military action (Wit et al., 2004, p. xv). It might have been 
possible for the United States to strike and destroy DPRK’s nuclear facilities from the air 
without suffering retaliation during the early 1990s. However, the United States intelligence 
community and its military leaders viewed it differently (Wit et al., 2004, p. xv). When 
negotiations with the regime in the DPRK stalled once again in the spring of 1994, the 
Clinton administration again considered an air strike on DPRK’s nuclear facilities (ibid). The 
United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea signed the Agreed Framework 
on 21 October 1994 and this agreement "froze Pyongyang's activities at its Yongbyon nuclear 
complex" in exchange for United States shipments of "heavy fuel oil" and United States 
"proliferation resistant light-water reactors” (Agreed Framework, 1994).  
Due to the signing of the agreement, no one will ever know how close the two countries came 
to a second Korean war (Wit et al., 2004, p. xv). The considerations of a military strike on 
DPRK’s nuclear facilities during the early years of the Clinton administration show that the 
United States took DPRK’s plans of pursuing a nuclear weapons program seriously. It is 
impossible to know what the Clinton administration feared the most, but Joel S. Wit, Daniel 
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B. Poneman and Robert L. Galluci’s28 views shows that the United States did fear a North 
Korean regime with nuclear weapons, and that they were willing to go far to stop it.  
It seemed at that point like the regime in Pyongyang was willing to trade its nuclear weapons 
program for favorable incentives within the Agreed Framework. For some time, there was 
reason to believe that the DPRK was willing to abandon its military program as long as they 
received what they had been promised, but the agreement started to fall apart towards the end 
of the 1990s. The United States started to back out, partly because Congress was reluctant to 
pay, making the United States unable to deliver on time the fuel oil that the Agreed 
Framework promised. The DPRK became suspicious of the United States when the fuel oil 
did not arrive in the winter. Also, President Clinton may have been hesitant because it was a 
common view at that time that communist regimes would fall one by one (Lodgaard, 2014 
[interview]). 
7.2.2 The DPRK Withdraws from the NPT – 2003 
The DPRK announced once more its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, and this time the 
country withdrew. The regime in Pyongyang issued a statement on 10 January 2003 saying 
that the DPRK “declares its total freedom from the binding force of the safeguards accord 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency” (BBC, 2003; CNN, 2003). Despite this the 
regime in Pyongyang made clear that it planned to limit its nuclear activities to peaceful 
purposes in a statement saying “our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to 
peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity” (BBC, 2003; CNN, 2003).  
Several governments condemned DPRK’s decision to quit the NPT including France, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea29. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer (2003) stated in a 
press briefing on 10 January 2003 that  
(…) given the fact that North Korea had already acknowledged that it was violating 
the very treaty that it had signed up to, it comes as no surprise, frankly, that they've 
made this announcement. Nevertheless, it is disappointing. This is an issue that gives 
                                                 
28 The three authors of the book Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis are all former United 
States officials. Joel S. Wit was a coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. Daniel B. 
Poneman was a part of the National Security Council Staff under President George H.W. Bush and President Bill 
Clinton and Robert L. Gallucci led the team that negotiated the Agreed Framework.  
29 The Republic of Korea’s reactions will be discussed in chapter 8  
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serious concern to the international committee and to the United States -- to the 
international community and to the United States (Fleischer, 2003).  
The wording from the United States after the DPRK withdrew from the NPT was very mild 
compared to other nation’s condemnation of Pyongyang’s actions. Journalists present at the 
press briefing with Ari Fleischer on 10 January 2003 did also question the mild tone coming 
from President Bush’s administration. One journalist said; “Speak of the condemnation of 
North Korea in strong terms, but the word "disappointing" is pretty mild in the language that's 
come from this podium, and so forth” (ibid). Press Secretary Fleischer responded by saying 
that “I used several adjectives. I said it was disappointing, it's serious concern, it's brought 
upon” (ibid). The United States made it clear that it viewed DPRK’s withdrawal as a serious 
concern, but this way of speaking of North Korean nuclear aspirations changed a lot during 
President Bush’s administration. Just a year earlier on 29 January 2002 President George W. 
Bush harshly criticized the regime in Pyongyang in his State of the Union address:  
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while 
starving its citizens. (…) States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these 
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our 
allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic. (President George W. Bush, 2002) 
This new way of speaking about the DPRK was contradictory to the rhetoric by the same 
administration just a year later. President Bush also called the DPRK a rouge regime in the 
2002 National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002). President Bush declared in 2002 
that indifference would be catastrophic, but one could claim that the “mild” wording that 
came just a year later from the same administration was partly indifference. The interesting 
question is to look at why the tone coming from President Bush changed so dramatically in 
just one year. What President Bush meant by indifference in 2002 is not known, but the 
rhetoric indicate something stronger than diplomatic actions. However, after DPRK’s 
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the White House Press Secretary made clear that “the 
President continues to view this as a situation that needs to be worked through in a diplomatic 
fashion” (Fleischer, 2003). 
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7.2.3 DPRK´s First Nuclear Test – 2006 
The DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, also during President Bush’s 
administration. Even though President Bush represented a more harsh rhetoric towards the 
regime in Pyongyang than President Clinton had, his first statement after the nuclear test in 
2006 stated: 
We (China, Russia, South Korea and Japan) reaffirmed our commitment to a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula, and all of us agreed that the proclaimed actions taken by 
North Korea are unacceptable and deserve an immediate response by the United 
Nations Security Council. …The United States remains committed to diplomacy, and 
we will continue to protect ourselves and our interests (President George W. Bush, 
2006).  
This statement is of a very different character than President Bush’s State of the Union speech 
in 2002. Bush here represents a view that is more in line with President Clinton. Indifference 
to DPRK’s first nuclear test did not happen, but the reprimands were presented through the 
UNSC. Resolution 1718 was unanimously adopted in 2006, and it prohibited the DPRK from 
conducting further nuclear tests or launching of ballistic missiles. It also called for the country 
to completely abandon its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and the resolution included a 
range of sanctions as well as to urge the DPRK to immediately return to the negotiating table 
for multilateral talks regarding its nuclear weapons program (United Nations Security 
Council, 2006). The sanctions did not work fully as intended because the DPRK continued to 
pursue and further develop its nuclear weapons program. The sanctions might have delayed 
DPRK’s process to develop nuclear weapons, but it did not stop the process entirely. 
President Bush used a hard tone before DPRK’s nuclear weapons program was verified, but 
the United States did little officially outside UN channels after Pyongyang’s first nuclear test.  
7.2.4 DPRK´s Second Nuclear Test – 2009 
The Obama administration’s reactions towards the DPRK have been very similar to those of 
President Clinton and President Bush. President Obama’s reactions to Pyongyang’s rhetoric 
and actions are often characterized as “strategic patience”. This means that the Obama 
administration is waiting for DPRK to come to the negotiating table at the same time as they 
are maintaining pressure on the regime (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013, pp. 3–4). The main 
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elements of the current American policy regarding the DPRK consist of insisting that the 
DPRK commit to move toward denuclearization while DPRK also mends its relationship with 
the ROK and returns to the Six Party talks30. The Americans also want China to have a 
rougher line with the Pyongyang regime while inflicting arms interdictions and sanctions 
towards the DPRK. An American fear is that DPRK will sell nuclear technology to another 
country or non-state actor due to the country’s poor economy (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 
2013, pp. 3–4).  
It may seem like the Obama administration’s way of dealing with the Kim family might not 
be working as intended. For example, the UNSC issued a reprimand after a long-range 
ballistic missile test in May 2009, but the North Korean regime conducted its second nuclear 
test in November 2009. The United States on the other hand followed the North Korean act 
with coordinating passage of UNSC Resolution 1874 which outlines sanctions to deny 
financial assistance to the regime in Pyongyang (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013, p. 5). This 
resolution also created a legal basis for states to embargo ships coming from the DPRK if the 
ships were suspected of carrying items that had previously been banned by UNSC resolutions, 
and the resolution also demanded that the regime in Pyongyang "not conduct any further 
nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology” (NTI, 2009). The sanctions and 
the warning from the UNSC did not have the intended effect after the first nuclear test in 2006 
neither after the second nuclear test in 2009 (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013, p. 5). 
President Barack Obama condemned the test saying they will only “further isolate” the DPRK  
(Davenport, 2013b). Kim Jong-il responded to Obama’s threats by an official KCNA 
statement saying that Pyongyang would continue testing and building its arsenal unless the 
United States recognized its right to launch satellites and develop its nuclear program 
(Davenport, 2013b). As one can see President Obama reacted towards the first nuclear test 
that occurred during his presidential period, but the reaction was mild.  In connection to the 
first two nuclear tests, the United States has taken the UN route and followed diplomatic 
lines. There has been no military attack on the DPRK, or any other attempts except 
diplomatic, to make the regime in Pyongyang abandon its nuclear weapons.  
The DPRK has been very clear on what it wants from the Americans (see Section 7.1). The 
United States have acknowledged that DPRK possesses nuclear weapons, but the United 
                                                 
30 The six-party talks are a series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and attended by 
China, Japan, the DPRK, Russia, the ROK, and the United States. The purpose of the talks is to dismantle 
DPRK’s nuclear weapon program. The talks are hosted in Beijing and chaired by China.  
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States refuses to recognize the DPRK as a NWS.  American officials have stated and insisted 
that the situation is “unacceptable”. Many analysts believe that the DPRK is not willing to 
give up its nuclear weapons and that the demands are purely tactical moves (Chanlett-Avery 
and Rinehart 2013, 7). The North Koreans confirmed this when they stated in March 2013 
that the North Korean nuclear weapons were not a bargaining chip and that they would not be 
abandoned for even billions of dollars (ibid). Holding onto power is important in internal 
affairs as well as holding on to leverage in international affairs. 
7.2.5 DPRK´s Third Nuclear test – 2013  
Before the third nuclear test occurred, the Obama administration threatened to penalize the 
DPRK through the UN and the UNSC if a third nuclear test took place (Sanger & Sang-hun, 
2013a). When the third nuclear test took place 12 February 2013, President Obama reacted by 
stating that “we will lead the world in taking firm action” (Crowley, 2013; President Barack 
Obama, 2013). The President also stated that the DPRK  
(…) would only achieve security by meeting its international obligations. (…) 
Provocations of the sort we saw last night will only isolate them further as we stand by 
our allies, strengthen our own missile defense and lead the world in taking firm action 
in response to these threats. (President Barack Obama, 2013) 
After the test was conducted, the UNSC met in an emergency session that resulted in the 
members unanimously backing a statement which called the DPRK’s actions “grave 
violation” of UN resolutions. The UNSC states that “in line with this commitment and the 
gravity of this violation, the members of the Security Council will begin work immediately on 
appropriate measures in a Security Council resolution” (ibid). The United States once again 
responded to DPRK’s nuclear threats and actions with sanctions through the UNSC even 
though President Obama had stated that he would lead the world in taking firm action. The 
truth is that the UNSC already had applied so many sanctions against the DPRK that there 
were few useful sanctions left that the UNSC could apply. The only sanction according to 
David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun (2013a) that would truly hurt the DPRK was if China 
cut off oil and other forms of aid. According to the two journalists, the Chinese at that point 
feared instability and chaos in the DPRK more than it feared a growing North Korean nuclear 
capability, and that is why the Chinese refused to cut off ties with the DPRK (ibid). The 
United States reactions to the North Korean nuclear threats indicate that “firm action” again 
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means acting within the UNSC. Considering whether the UNSC is the right way of reacting to 
DPRK’s actions is outside the scope of this thesis, but it is interesting to look at the fact that 
previous UNSC sanctions have not worked as intended as the North Koreans have continued 
to pursue its nuclear weapons program.  
There are a limited number of reactions at hand for the United States in addition to 
condemning the DPRK through the UNSC. The only other options are military action and 
military intervention in another country due to that country’s possession of nuclear weapons. 
Such reactions would constitute serious steps that could result in severe consequences for the 
United States. American reactions towards DPRK’s nuclear actions have been much harsher 
rhetorically prior to the nuclear tests than after the nuclear tests have been conducted, but that 
does not necessarily mean that the United States is frightened by North Korean nuclear 
threats.  
This chapter has focused on the accuracy of North Korean threats directed at the United States 
and American reactions to the threats. One cannot say anything with absolute certainty when 
discussing North Korean nuclear weapons due to the secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons. It 
does however seem from the discussion above that the DPRK at this moment have the 
capability to hit American vital interests in the region, but whether these capabilities are 
reliable or not is difficult to estimate. The American reactions to DPRK’s nuclear behavior 
vary, and some incidents seem to be taken more seriously than other by the Americans. The 
American reactions are in the form of written statements and UN sanctions, but one can 
question what other reactions would have been realistically possible. Chapter 9 will 
summarize the findings of this chapter and a more thorough conclusion will be found there.  
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8 DPRK’s Will to Use Nuclear 
Weapons against the Republic of Korea 
The relationship between the DPRK and the ROK is very different from the relationship 
between the DPRK and the United States. The DPRK was the richer of the two Koreas forty 
years ago; today, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is starved, isolated and 
sanctioned. Its population is gradually becoming aware of the fact that the ROK is superior to 
them in many aspects, particularly in economic terms (Noland, 2007). The South Korean 
people have for many years lived with the threat from the North. Since the end of the Korean 
War, the ROK has been aware of the threat implicit in DPRKs conventional military forces. 
North Korean artillery has been directed at Seoul, and if the DPRK were to attack Seoul, then 
much of Seoul would be laid in ruins. It would be impossible to evacuate the population of 
Seoul due to the city’s population density and crowed roads. Still, the South Koreans have 
been exposed to the conventional threat for such a long time and have learned to live with it 
(Diplomat, 2014 [interview]).  
A nuclear war between the two Koreas would mean the end of the government in the DPRK 
because the ROK is covered by the United States extended deterrence through their military 
alliance. The ROK depends on the United States for security and military capabilities. If a 
conflict should arise between the South and the North, the United States would be forced to 
intervene not only due to its military alliance with the ROK, but also because of the presence 
of American personnel in the South (USFK, 2014). The DPRK would lose a nuclear war 
because the Americans would intervene according to the military alliance with the ROK. But 
there are questions related to what military means the United States would use. The diplomat 
(2014) interviewed does not believe that the ROK would accept that the United States used 
nuclear weapons in a possible conflict. One reason is that it would be impossible to prevent 
nuclear fall-out – depending on the current weather conditions – from affecting the 
populations of the ROK, Japan China, and Russia in addition to the people in the North. The 
United States would most likely be able to take out the North Korean artillery within twenty 
four hours using conventional warfare, although the DPRK artillery is becoming more mobile 
and protected (Diplomat, 2014 [interview]). A conventional war could mean the end of the 
North Korean army and regime. Hence, the United States would not need to use nuclear 
weapons towards the DPRK during a possible conflict between the two Koreas (ibid). 
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Sverre Lodgaard (2014 [interview]) like James M. Acton view DPRK’s harsh rhetoric and 
threats as a part of its deterrence policy. Sverre Lodgaard believes that DPRK’s goal is to 
avoid an attack on the DPRK. The North Korean tactics are therefore defensive. When a 
regime is subjected to regime survival, it is possible that it is willing to use nuclear weapons. 
But DPRK’s rhetoric is unlike anyone else’s, and Sverre Lodgaard sees no rationale for the 
country to be offensive. The regime in Pyongyang uses such harsh threats to keep the enemy 
away (ibid). The diplomat interviewed in relation to this thesis agrees with both Sverre 
Lodgaard and James M. Acton. In addition the diplomat states that the elite in Pyongyang 
consist of about 2,000 people. These people are very privileged. The rhetoric they use is 
ideologically based, but it is difficult to know how deeply members of the North Korean elite 
today believe in Kim Il-sung’s Juche ideology. Through recent events, it is known that an 
opposition to Kim Jong-un exists. But in the end, the survival of the privileged is closely 
linked to regime survival (Diplomat, 2014 [interview]).  
The DPRK regime is unlike any other, and Juche might have lost some of its “power” in 
terms of deciding foreign and domestic policies. On 30 March 2014 the regime in Pyongyang 
expressed the importance of the Songun ideology in a KCNA news report, stating that 
Expressing full support to the Songun politics pursued by supreme leader Kim Jong-
un, we hope that all Korean people will shatter the vicious moves of the separatists at 
home and abroad and dynamically conduct the movement for national reunification on 
a nationwide scale, rallied close under the banner of By Our Nation Itself. The Korean 
people's struggle for peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula and national 
prosperity is sure to win thanks to the ever-victorious Songun politics (KCNA, 2014) 
Unification of the two Korean states was Kim Il-sung’s big dream, but today reunification 
meets important obstacles on both sides, particularly in the South. The two Koreas are 
gradually becoming two distinct nations. Young people in the South generally no longer feel 
any attachment to their brethren in the North. Many feel that reunification will become too 
costly for the ROK, since the DPRK would not to be able to take care of itself. Many business 
people in the ROK are primarily interested in the DPRK as a market (Diplomat, 2014 
[interview]).  Although the North Koreans generally long for reunification, many would also 
have their doubts, because they know that the ROK has become a fiercely competitive 
society, in which they would lose out. Most North Koreans would therefore probably prefer to 
remain in the North, because they fear to be stigmatized and looked down upon in the South. 
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Merely on the people-to-people level, this makes reunification prospects for the two countries 
somewhat complicated (Diplomat, 2014 [interview]). But if the DPRK were to admit that 
reunification was no longer possible, the psychological effect on the population might be 
severe. Moreover, the regime would seem to have failed in terms of Kim Il-sung’s big dream. 
It is important to keep in mind the enormous admiration and status Kim Il-sung still has 
among the people in the North and in terms of shaping the regime’s policies. He is still 
worshiped as the President of the Republic, a title which will belong to him forever (ibid).  
8.1 DPRK’s Nuclear Threats Directed at the 
Republic of Korea 
The diplomat (2014 [interview]) stated during the interview that the Korean people are very 
homogeneous when it comes to culture and language, but politics polarizes the two Korean 
populations. Even though Koreans have a clear Korean identity, they are also very warrior 
like in their rhetoric towards one another as well as towards other “enemies” (ibid). Soldiers 
on both sides of the Korean peninsula are well equipped for war and well aware of the fact 
that the two countries are still formally at war with each other. The South Koreans have a long 
experience with not being able to trust its neighbor in the north (ibid). The DPRK does not try 
to rebuild this trust; instead it keeps on threatening the ROK and its people with conventional 
and nuclear attacks:  
The regime would be well advised to be well aware that it is fated to meet the complete 
ruin which can never be recovered by the nuclear carrier and anything else more 
powerful than it if it continues pursuing reckless military provocations against the 
DPRK, backed by its American master (KCNA, 2013f).  
The Republic of Korea is at much greater risk than the United States of being hit by North 
Korean nuclear weapons due to ROK’s close proximity to the DPRK. On 23 November 2010 
the DPRK fired scores of artillery shells at Yeonpyeong, a South Korean island. This attack 
killed four South Koreans and injured many more (Sudworth, 2010). The attack came after a 
South Korean artillery exercise in the waters in the South. The ROK claimed that military 
drills in the area were not intended at the DPRK. The South Korean military went to “crisis 
status” after the North Korean shelling, and the ROK also threatened with military strikes and 
an exchange of fire was set off in one of the most severe clashes between the two states since 
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the Korean War ended in 1953 (J. Kim & Jae-won, 2010; Mcdonald, 2010). The shelling 
surprised the rest of the world as well as the Republic of Korea, and it is hard to imagine what 
Kim Jong-il may have wanted to get out of the attack (Sudworth, 2010). Another major 
incident also occurred between the two Korean states in 2010 when the South Korean warship 
Cheonan was sunk killing 46 South Korean sailors. Many assume that the ship was sunk by a 
North Korean torpedo, but the DPRK has never admitted to being responsible for the attack 
(Sang-hun, 2010). There are speculations about whether the two events were intended to show 
Kim Jong-un’s strength against military leaders in anticipation of taking over after his father, 
but no proof of this exists.  
The DPRK is a state filled with problems. Pyongyang’s foreign policy, which is built on 
aggression, has resulted in several international sanctions (Davenport, 2013a). A siege 
mentality has occurred as a result of the foreign policy and the consequences that have come 
of it. Military provocations can be seen as a strategy of maintaining regime security. This is a 
very risky strategy, but it has been proven successful through the continuation of the Kim 
regime (Frank, 2010). The incidents in 2010 show that the ROK is still on the DPRK´s 
foreign policy agenda, and the incidents have not been the only serious events between the 
two Koreas. The DPRK has also threatened the ROK on other occasions:  
Once a war is ignited on the peninsula, it will be an all-out war, i.e. a merciless 
sacred retaliatory war to be waged by the DPRK. It does not want to see foreigners in 
South Korea fall victim to the war. The committee informs all foreign institutions and 
enterprises and foreigners including tourists in Seoul and all other parts of south 
Korea that they are requested to take measures for shelter and evacuation in advance 
for their safety (KCNA, 2013e).  
This KCNA news article came just a few days after Pyongyang suggested on 5 April 2013 
that foreign diplomats stationed in the DPRK should evacuate for their own safety (Starr, 
Mullen, & Sterling, 2013). The 2013 Korean crisis is by some classified as one of the most 
severe since the 1968 Korean crisis when the DPRK captured USS Pueblo, a United States 
Navy spy ship (Vorontsov, 2013). The 2013 Korean crisis (referred to as the “North Korean 
crisis” by media) started due to an escalation of tension between the DPRK, the ROK, the 
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United States and Japan. This tension erupted from UNSC Resolution 208731 which again 
was a reaction to North Korean flight testing of the Unha-3 missile in December of 2012 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). The regime in Pyongyang escalated its harsh rhetoric, 
suggesting nuclear attacks against the ROK, Japan and the United States. The tension 
escalated further by the annual military drills between the United States and the ROK, which 
took place during the same period of time (Press, 2013; Williamson, 2013). Pyongyang has 
regularly claimed that the military drills are a preparation for invasion, but after the 2013 drill 
the North Korean regime began to show heightened anger. Before the UN sanctions were 
decided, the DPRK threatened to fire a nuclear missile at the United States and so warned the 
ROK of a nuclear war on the divided peninsula. According to the South Koreans, the regime 
in Pyongyang cut off the hotline32 that was meant to maintain the armistice treaty33 between 
the two countries. When the military exercise started, the North Koreans apparently did not 
answer two calls. The hotline was installed in 1971 and has only been disconnected on five 
previous occasions (Press, 2013; Williamson, 2013). The regime in Pyongyang said it had the 
right to carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike before they cut off the hotline, but such rhetoric 
is not unusual for the DPRK. The South Korean president, Park Geun-hye, said at the time 
that the security situation was “very grave” and that the ROK would “deal strongly” with 
provocations coming from the DPRK. President Park Geun-hye also made it clear that she 
would be ready to talk to the Kim regime if it "comes out on the path toward change" (BBC, 
2013a).  
During this crisis Kim Jong-un, according to the KCNA, visited the front-line military units 
that had been involved in the 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong, and the same reports said that 
Kim Jong-un had urged the North Korean soldiers to be ready to "annihilate the enemy" at 
any time (BBC, 2013a). During the crisis, it seemed like the DPRK was trying to build a 
sense of crisis internally; among other things a large rally was staged in Pyongyang (ibid). An 
exaggerated external threat is a useful tool to gather the people around the leadership. From 
                                                 
31 Resolution 2087 condemned the launch of ballistic missile technology in violation of the sanctions imposed on 
the DPRK previously. The launch took place on 12 December 2012. The UNSC demanded that the DPRK not 
proceed with any further such activities and expressed its “determination to take significant action” in the event 
it did so (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013).  
32 The hotline was installed in 1971, and is intended as a means of direct communication at times of high tension, 
but is also used to co-ordinate the passage of people and goods through the DMZ (BBC, 2013a).  
33 The two Koreas are still technically at war because an armistice was signed at the end of the 1950-53 Korean 
conflict, rather than a peace agreement (Williamson, 2013).  
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this time to the present, it seems that Kim Jong-un has continually tried to cement his power 
base.  
The DPRK has previously broken agreements. Hence, withdrawing from an agreement such 
as the one that occurred during the 2013 Korean crisis does not mean war. However, it created 
an unstable situation. The shutting down of the hotline left the two Koreas more exposed to 
misunderstandings, and misunderstandings could have resulted in severe consequences. The 
2013 Korean crisis did not result in war, but Kim Jong-un´s actions during this period were 
unpredictable, and it is important to remember that he is young and inexperienced with 
foreign affairs: 
The way one very experienced North Korea watcher described it to me is that it was 
like watching an 18 year old having his first driving lesson. The first time you are put 
in front of a car most people have the tendency to steer the wheel much too far. You 
exaggerate every movement. That was the problem with Kim Jong-un. He does not 
really understand how to calibrate his responses so that they do not go too far (Acton, 
2014 [phone interview]).  
During conversations with the three respondents interviewed for this thesis it was made clear 
that the crisis in 2013 was serious and not to be underestimated. James M. Acton (2014 
[phone interview]) stated that “you can easily imagine last year’s crisis getting out of hand” 
because imagine a scenario like the 2013 Korean crisis where the DPRK makes nuclear 
threats against the United States. The United States responds with starting their B-2s34. What 
if the DPRK then believe or worry that the B-2s are carrying nuclear weapons? During such a 
possible scenario, things could get out of hand. Because of Kim Jong-un´s inexperience, there 
is possibly a much higher risk of an escalating situation (ibid). The 2013 Korean crisis shows 
that the relationship between the two states is unstable with little, if any trust between the two. 
Hence the crisis could have escalated to a war. The Republic of Korea has more vital interests 
at risk than the United States, because it shares a border with the DPRK and is within the 
reliable range of North Korean ballistic missiles. The DPRK has threatened the ROK with 
nuclear weapons on several occasions. Tensions between the two countries are high as can be 
learned from the 2010 and 2013 crises. The Republic of Korea does probably have specific 
                                                 
34 A B-2 is An American strategic bomber also known as Stealth Bomber and the B-2 is capable of delivering 
both conventional and nuclear weapons against heavily defended targets (National Museum of the US Air Force, 
2010).  
74 
 
vital interests that are of more importance than others in terms of North Korean nuclear 
threats, but the whole of the ROK is a vital interest due to the state’s close proximity to the 
DPRK. North Korean ballistic missiles can reach all of the ROK.  
8.2 South Korean Reactions to North Korean 
Nuclear Threats 
The relationship between the two states on the Korean peninsula has been tense for a long 
time. The DPRK in the north view the ROK in the south as an American puppet and enemy, 
but the relationship between the two Koreas has changed drastically over the years since 
199335. The same North Korean nuclear incidents that were discussed in Chapter 7 will be 
discussed below. The same incidents are chosen in order to show similarities and differences 
in American and South Korean reactions to North Korean nuclear incidents.  
8.2.1 The DPRK Threatens to Withdraw from the NPT – 
1993 
Speculations of a North Korean nuclear weapons program started in 1993, and when the 
South Korean President Kim Young-sam was elected in 1993 he made clear that a “peaceful 
coexistence, joint prosperity, and common welfare” was his goal with the neighbor in the 
North. President Kim Young-sam also encouraged the Americans to praise his idea of 
interacting with the DPRK because he believed he had a much better policy of interacting 
with the North Koreans than previous South Korean regimes (Wit et al., 2004, p. 65). This 
new way of reaching out a hand to the regime in the DPRK changed just a week later when 
President Kim Young-sam told the press “I want to make clear that we cannot shake hands 
with any partner who has nuclear weapons” (ibid). 
DPRK’s threat to withdraw from the NPT was of serious concern for the Republic of Korea, 
but it was the United States that dominated the efforts to persuade the North Koreans not to 
withdraw from the treaty. President Kim Young-sam’s approach is by many analysts seen as a 
failure, because he failed to be consistent in his reactions and policies towards the DPRK. The 
President was very receptive to outside pressure (Nahm & Hoare, 2004, p. cvii). When others 
                                                 
35 The period studied in this thesis is 1993 until present day and the relationship between the two Koreas prior to 
1993 will therefore not be discussed.  
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showed hostility towards the DPRK, President Kim Young-sam would change his way of 
interacting with the neighbor in the north. Even though it was hard to know how President 
Kim Young-sam would react to a North Korean action, he maintained a dialogue with the 
regime in Pyongyang, but the South Koreans were sidelined by the Americans when former 
President Carter started negotiations with the DPRK in June 1994. A summit was planned 
between the two leaders on the Korean Peninsula, but when Kim Il-sung passed away, the 
summit was postponed. President Kim Young-sam’s refusal to express any condolences 
resulted in an end to all dialogue between the two countries during President Kim Young-
sam’s time in office (ibid).  
8.2.2 The DPRK Withdraws from the NPT – 2003 
Kim Dae-jung was elected president of the Republic of Korea in 1997. He stepped away from 
his predecessor’s harsh tone towards the DPRK and adopted a way of interacting with the 
DPRK and reacting to its nuclear threats known as the “Sunshine Policy” (Y. Kim, 2003, p. 
3). The analogy of the sunshine policy is taken from the famous Aesop’s fable “the North 
Wind and the Sun”. The point of the fable is that the Sun wins over the North wind in a 
dispute over which of them that could first strip a man of his clothes. The cold wind from the 
north makes the man wrap his clothes more tightly around him. The Sun on the other hand 
makes the man take one garment off after the other. The Sun represents President Kim Dae-
Jung’s administration of embracing and engaging with the DPRK in order to open up the 
closed society. The Wind from the North symbolizes the previous South Korean policy of 
containment represented among others by President Kim Young-sam (Y. Kim, 2003, p. 3). 
The Sunshine policy meant that the ROK gave rice, fertilizers and more to the DPRK. The 
idea behind this new way of interacting with the DPRK was to build confidence without 
setting conditions or demanding immediate reciprocity. The ultimate goal was to establish a 
relationship where people, goods and services could flow freely in and out of the DMZ 
(Moon, 2012, p. 17). 
The interviewed diplomat ( 2014 [interview]) believes that the Sunshine policy went too far 
and was naive in terms of what Kim Dae-jung thought he could extract in return from Kim 
Jong-il. Moreover, the hand that the South Korean government reached out to the North came 
without conditions. For instance, rice rations from the ROK were basically placed on the 
border where it was up to the North Korean regime to distribute it to its people. The rice 
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probably did not primarily reach the starving North Korean population that needed it the 
most. Instead, it probably went straight into the hands of the military (ibid). On the other 
hand, one could argue that even if the food went to the military, it could nevertheless 
contribute to alleviating the general food situation in the North. Today, we know that it would 
have been very difficult for the South Koreans to extract concessions in return, because the 
regime in Pyongyang never intended to give in to South Korean demands. We saw that when 
president Roh Moo-hyun tried to negotiate a more balanced cooperation agreement with Kim 
Jong-il in 2010. This agreement was never implemented (ibid).  
The regime in Pyongyang had threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, and the DPRK 
followed through with this threat ten years later. President-elect Roh Moo-hyun expressed 
regret that the DPRK had chosen to withdraw. A South Korean government spokesperson said 
according to Yonhap that “Roh had urged North Korea to rescind its decision to resume 
nuclear facility operations and asked it to at least avoid actions that will further aggravate the 
situation” (CNN, 2003). The official South Korean reaction towards DPRK’s withdrawal 
from the NPT was of a milder character than the reaction from President Bush, and not 
substantial. While the United States showed disappointment over the North Korean decision, 
the South Korean President only urged the North Koreans not to further aggravate the 
situation. This mild tone might have been a result of the Sunshine Policy, because the fear of 
a North Korean nuclear weapons program was growing at the time. Due to the ROKs close 
proximity to the DPRK, one can assume that it would fear a possible North Korean nuclear 
threat much more than the United States would.   
8.2.3 The DPRK´s First Nuclear Test – 2006 
DPRK’s first nuclear test took place in 2006 during South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s 
administration. This test shocked the Republic of Korea, mainly because it had insisted on a 
denuclearization of the DPRK through its sunshine policy. But even though President Roh 
Moo-hyun was shocked, the ROK continued its engagement with the north without any 
interruption. The South Korean President even stated that DPRK’s nuclear weapons had a 
defensive and not an offensive purpose (Kang, 2009). Many nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the South Korean population were not worried about the threats coming from the 
north because they believed that the DPRK would never use nuclear weapons against them 
because of the Sunshine Policy (Kang, 2009). Even though the South Korean public might not 
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have been afraid of a nuclear attack from its neighbor, President Roh Moo-hyun’s 
administration was scared of provoking the Kim regime in Pyongyang. President Roh Moo-
hyun did not join the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that was 
meant to interdict possible shipments of weapons of mass destruction by the DPRK (ibid).  
The Sunshine Policy started with President Kim Dae-jung and was continued with his 
successor President Roh Moo-hyun. They both conducted a Sunshine Policy, but President 
Roh Moo-hyun was harsher and demanded more from the North Koreans than President Kim 
had done (Diplomat, 2014 [interview]). The presidents of the Koreas met in October 2007 
where they agreed upon a lot more aid from the South to the North, but President Roh Moo-
hyun wanted something in return. His Sunshine policy was one based on tit for tat (ibid). 
Today North Koreans, particularly in Pyongyang and other big cities, know about life in the 
South. This threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the regime in relations to its people and 
is an increasing challenge to the regime in Pyongyang. One way they are handling this is by 
claiming that the North Koreans are the pure Koreans who stand up to Americans and that the 
South Koreans are American puppets (ibid).   
8.2.4 The DPRK´s Second Nuclear Test – 2009 
When the second North Korean nuclear test took place, there was a new South Korean 
President in office, President Lee Myung-bak. How to handle the DPRK was never an issue to 
President Lee during his election campaign. It was given that the ROK would stop 
fraternizing with the DPRK, if Lee Myung-bak were elected. Lee did not have to make it an 
issue during his campaign because it was just understood, as part of the general polarization 
of South Korean politics (Diplomat, 2014 [interview]).  
I have met retired diplomats who have privately called President Roh Moo-hyun a 
traitor due to his appeasement policy toward the North. These people are otherwise 
reasonable people (Diplomat, 2014 [interview]).  
After DPRK’s second nuclear test on 25 May 2009, the South Korean government reacted 
tougher than during the first test. They issued a statement condemning the nuclear blast as 
constituting “a grave challenge to the international nonproliferation regime”. The statement 
also said that the test was “a provocation that can never be tolerated under any 
circumstances”, and a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
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1718  (NTI, 2009). After the test President Obama and President Lee Myung-bak agreed to 
“seek a stern, unified international reaction". It has also been reported afterwards that 
President Obama stated that the United States would continue to "provide a strong nuclear 
deterrence for South Korea" (NTI, 2009). In June 2009 the South Korean and the American 
President agreed that the DPRK would “under no circumstances” be allowed to possess 
nuclear weapons (NTI, 2009). President Lee also made it clear that the DPRK would be 
deterred by the military alliance between the United States and the ROK if they were tempted 
to attack the South. President Lee Myung-bak announced already on 26 May 2009 that the 
ROK would fully participate in the PSI, the initiative his predecessor had chosen not to be a 
part of (ibid).  
This act in itself illustrates the two very different reactions directed at the regime in 
Pyongyang and suggests that President Lee Myung-bak took the nuclear threat more seriously 
than President Roh Moo-hyun. President Roh Moo-hyun’s way of dealing with the regime in 
Pyongyang was clearly not efficient because the DPRK continued to pursue its nuclear 
weapons program. On the other hand, President Lee Myung-bak’s harsher tone and reactions 
increased the distance between the DPRK and the ROK. The intensity and severity of the 
North Korean threats escalated during President Lee Myung-bak’s period.   
8.2.5 The DPRK´s Third Nuclear test – 2013  
President Kim Dae-Jung and President Roh Moo-hyun both reached out a hand to the DPRK. 
President Lee Myung-bak was on the contrary not outreaching. Kim Jong-Il’s regime had 
made clear that it if the South Koreans joined the PSI, this would be understood as a 
declaration of war. After the ROK joined the PSI, the regime in the DPRK declared that they 
would attack the ROK if any North Korean ships were searched. Since President Lee Myung-
bak took office in 2008, the relationship between the two Koreas deteriorated (ibid). The 
diplomat (2014 [interview]) interviewed believes that President Lee’s term – in relation to the 
DPRK – was a wasted one. This is due to the fact that the ROK isolated the DPRK, which in 
turn contributed towards pushing the Pyongyang regime into China’s arms. Today, it is the 
Chinese who handle all new industrial projects in the DPRK. Neither the South nor the North 
wanted such a development, but it has occurred partly because of the ROKs tough line with 
the DPRK (ibid). 
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When the third nuclear test occurred in February 2013, the South Korean President-elect Park 
Geun-hye reacted by stating that  
Despite the strong warning from the international community and South Korea, North 
Korea has conducted its third nuclear test, and we strongly condemn it. The North 
Korean nuclear test is a serious threat to the peace of the Korean peninsula and the 
world, and it has hampered the credibility between the South and North (President-
elect Park Geun-hye quoted in Payne, 2013).  
The new South Korean government continued President Lee Myung-bak’s harsh rhetoric with 
the DPRK, and similarly to the United States, the ROK condemned DPRK’s actions. The 
president-elect also made clear that the North Korean nuclear actions hampered the 
relationship between the two Koreas. One can argue that this relationship already was 
severely damaged partly due to the earlier nuclear tests and President Lee’s actions.  
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9 Summing up: Are the Opponents 
Disposed to North Korean Nuclear 
Deterrence? 
It is not straight forward to say whether or not DPRK’s threats directed at the United States 
and the Republic of Korea are credible or not. Much information is unknown and unsure. It is 
therefore important to keep in mind that there are no yes or no answers when discussing the 
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and deterrent credibility. However, one can argue for 
degrees of credibility. From sources presented in this thesis, it seems clear that the DPRK has 
produced fissile material and successfully assembled an implosion nuclear weapon design. 
However, the DPRK has no reliable capability to hit targets inside the continental United 
States with a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear charge at this moment. It is known that the 
DPRK has missiles that can reach the ROK, but it is unsure if the DPRK has the reliable 
capability to mount a nuclear charge on a warhead at this time.  
DPRK’s will to use nuclear weapons is much more uncertain than its ability to use such 
weapons. The government in the DPRK may, according to findings in this thesis, be 
considered rational; however, Kim Jong-un is a very young and inexperienced leader, and his 
moves and tactics in the past have been rather unpredictable.  It therefore does not seem like 
the regime Pyongyang would risk using nuclear weapons unless the consequences of not 
using nuclear weapons are worse than using them. Such a scenario seems unlikely because 
regime survival is the most important thing to Kim Jong-un, and using nuclear weapons 
would most likely result in the end of his regime. Simultaneously, the DPRK is aware that the 
United States possesses a much larger and more sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons than 
the DPRK.  
According to deterrence theory, deterrence is weakened when the credibility of a threat is not 
complete. This implies that DPRK’s nuclear weapons program does not deter as much as it 
could when it comes to credibility. In this relation it is important to look at how, especially, 
the United States has acted towards the DPRK when it has conducted nuclear tests and 
directed threats towards the United States. Neither the United States nor the Republic of 
Korea has done much more than condemning North Korean actions and supporting UNSC 
sanctions against the country. This could mean that neither of the countries are taking the 
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threats seriously, but what else could the two countries have done? What reason could have 
been used for a potential invasion? The DPRK has threatened the United State with 
conventional and nuclear weapons attack, but the country has never attacked the United 
States. If the United States were to intervene militarily in the DPRK, this would make the 
United States the attacker, and the UN could never support such an intervention. Military 
intervention and regime change is also what the DPRK seems to fear the most. Predicting 
North Korean reaction and behavior to such an event is almost impossible. It is possible that 
the regime in Pyongyang would risk using nuclear weapons if they perceived that to be the 
only option. A military intervention by the United States could be perceived as such a 
situation, but this again is very speculative. Prevention of the use of nuclear weapons is in 
everyone’s best interest because the damage a nuclear weapon can cause is difficult to control 
the scope of. The interesting aspect with American reactions and statements directed at North 
Korean nuclear actions is that the language was toned down after the DPRK conducted its 
nuclear tests. The tone prior to tests, as in the case of President Bush’s State of the Union 
speech, was much more severe than the subsequent reactions to the nuclear tests. This change 
of severity in the condemnation of North Korean behavior does not necessary mean that the 
United States does not feel threatened by DPRK’s actions, but due to the mismatch in military 
strength and the geographical distance between the two states, it is very unlikely that the 
DPRK would attack the United States with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, if such an attack 
was actually carried out, the regime in Pyongyang would most likely be eliminated, and 
regime survival is much of the reason behind the North Korean acquisition of nuclear 
weapons.   
The ROK would possibly risk its own people’s security and survival by taking military action 
against the DPRK. The DPRK attacked the Republic of Korea when the country shelled 
Yeonpyeong Island in 2013, killing four South Koreans. The North Koreans claimed that the 
South Korean military exercise in the area was carried out to attack the DPRK even though 
this was denied by the South Korean government. Looking at that situation with South 
Korean or American eyes, the North Koreans attacked the ROK unprovoked, and the ROK 
could have retaliated. What the ROK would have gained by retaliating is unknown and 
probably limited. With today’s relationship between the two Koreas, condemnation and UN 
sanctions seem like the only probable and rational ways of reacting to North Korean nuclear 
threats. This means that even though South Korean reactions seem mild, they might actually 
imply that the ROK takes DPRK’s nuclear threats seriously and that it does feel threatened. If 
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the South Korean government did not perceive North Korean nuclear actions as threatening, 
then the South Korean President would most likely let North Korean actions pass in silence.  
One can argue that the United States’ response has been rather weak when the DPRK has 
conducted its nuclear tests. This could be a sign of the United States being deterred by the 
DPRK, but it could also mean that the United States does not view the nuclear threat as 
credible. It could also mean that states choose diplomacy over military action believing that 
diplomacy will provide the greatest benefits in the long term, and this might have been a 
calculated American strategy. It is most likely a combination of a variety of well thought out 
calculated responses, but the DPRK might deter the United States at the moment due to 
uncertainties. Today it is assumed that the DPRK does not have ICBMs, but the DPRK might 
get this technology in the future, and how close this future is unknown. The Americans could 
be worried that DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is bigger and more sophisticated and that 
tends to deter. Uncertainty contributes to deterrence. 
The United States might be deterred by the DPRK because even though the North Koreans do 
not have a reliable capacity to hit the continental United States at this moment, the regime 
most likely has the capacity to hit American vital interests in the region. Some of these 
interests are Japan, the Republic of Korea and military bases in the Pacific. The United States 
is a world power and militarily superior to most states. This could mean that the country has 
put itself in a vulnerable situation because a country like the DPRK would see benefits in 
hurting a world power. The DPRK’s rhetoric and threats directed at the United States at home 
and abroad have always been harsh and unlike any other states. One might ignore the threats 
because they seem too unrealistic, but when threats were directed at Guam, the United States 
appeared to take them seriously. Even though Guam is outside of the reliable range of North 
Korean ballistic missiles, the United States talked of missile shields to protect American vital 
interests on the island of Guam. This shows that the American government is taking North 
Korean threats seriously and is concerned about North Korean nuclear capabilities.  
The Republic of Korea is at a much greater risk than the United States of a North Korean 
nuclear attack if one purely looks at DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. The whole of the ROK is a 
vital interest due to the close proximity to the DPRK. Even though North Korean ballistic 
missiles have the range to hit the ROK, an attack may never occur because South Korean vital 
interests might coincide with North Korean vital interests. This comes in addition to the fact 
that any North Korean use of nuclear weapons would most likely mean the end of the Kim 
83 
 
regime, and due to the rationality of Kim Jong-un he would therefore not risk using nuclear 
weapons. If one imagines that the DPRK actually attacks the ROK with nuclear weapons, 
then how would Pyongyang prevent the nuclear fall-out from affecting the North? The close 
proximity of the two states puts the ROK at greater risk to North Korean nuclear weapons, but 
it could also hurt the DPRK after a possible nuclear attack.  
The main research question in this thesis has been how the United States and the Republic of 
Korea are disposed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear deterrence? The 
DPRK is clearly trying to deter these two states with its nuclear weapons program. According 
to the deterrence theory presented in Chapter 3, the DPRK needs to have the ability and the 
will to attack the states it is trying to deter. The states being deterred, in this case the United 
States and the Republic of Korea need to have vital interests that are being threatened by 
North Korean nuclear weapons. To give a short answer to a complicated question, the United 
States and the ROK are partially disposed to DPRK’s nuclear deterrence because the DPRK 
does not at this moment have the reliable capability to hit the continental United States with 
nuclear weapons, but the DPRK has the capability to hit targets in the Republic of Korea and 
American vital interests outside of the continental United States. Even though the DPRK can 
hurt the United States and the ROK with nuclear weapons, information provided in this thesis 
suggests that it is unlikely that Kim Jong-un would use nuclear weapons against another state 
because he is a rational actor and maintaining power is therefore of greatest importance to 
him. In short, this means that North Korean nuclear deterrence is both a myth and a reality 
because predicting what the DPRK will do in any given situation is almost impossible. The 
country is unlike any other, and one will never truly know to which degree the United States 
and the ROK feel threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. 
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Appendix A: List of Respondents  
Interviews Conducted 
March 2014 Sverre Lodgaard, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI) 
March 2014 James Acton, a senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the 
Carnegie Endowment 
April 2014 Diplomat, several years of experience with Korean politics.  
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Appendix B: Interview Guide  
Not all questions were asked to all the respondents, new questions were also formed during 
the interview and respondents also provided information not asked for by the interviewer.  
On the respondent: 
- Full name 
- Work place, title/position, tasks 
- How long worked on topics related to the DPRK, nuclear deterrence and nuclear 
weapons.  
 
Deterrence  
- Why do states wish to acquire or develop nuclear weapons? 
- Do nuclear weapons have to be operative to deter?  
- What would you say are the main reasons for the emergence and growth of DPRK’s 
nuclear weapons program? 
- What are DPRK’s main goals with its nuclear weapons program? 
 
DPRK’s ability to use nuclear weapons 
- What are DPRK’s nuclear capabilities; do they have the ability to hit their 
enemies/targets?  
- Do DPRK’s nuclear weapons pose a threat to the United States?  
- What good are DPRK’s <10 nuclear weapons if the U.S. has 7,700? 
 
The DPRK and the United States 
- Does the DPRK have the will to use nuclear weapons?  
- How has the United States been affected, do they feel threatened by DPRK’s nuclear 
weapons? 
- Would the United States act differently towards the DPRK if the DPRK did not have 
nuclear weapons? 
- Are the chances for someone invading the DPRK smaller now than before they had 
nuclear weapons?  
 
The DPRK and the ROK 
- Why has not the ROK developed a nuclear weapons program?  
- Why is there so much tension on the Korean Peninsula? 
- Why has the DPRK threatened the ROK with a nuclear attack? 
- Is it probable that the DPRK would attack the ROK? 
- What do DPRK’s nuclear weapons threaten in the ROK? 
- Does the ROK perceive DPRK’s threats as believable?   
 
 
Is there anything else you would like to add?  
 
Is there anyone else you think it may be useful for me to meet/talk with?  
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